FORGOTTEN LINKAGES-HISTORICAL
INSTITUTIONALISM AND SOCIOLOGICAL
INSTITUTIONALISM AND ANALYSIS OF THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION
''
PHILIP M. NICHOLs

Institutionalism has become firmly entrenched in legal schol
arship.1 In particular, institutionalism has become a �owerful and
alluring theoretic for international law scholarship.
Given the
use of institutionalism in international law scholarship, and the
importance of international economic organizations to theory and
practice, it is natural that institutionalism has been prominently
used to scrutinize international economic organizations, including
the World Trade Organization.
When international law scholars utilize the tools of institu
tionalism, however, they tend to draw only from two sources.
International relation's regime theory3 has entered the main
stream of international law discourse, and has been applied di
rectly to the World Trade Organization. Institutional econom
ics,4 particularly transaction cost analysis, has also appeared in
international law discourse, and has been directly applied to or
ganizations that include the World Trade Organization.
Regime theory and institutional economics, however, do not
exhaust the universe of sources of institutional analysis. Virtually

Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, The Wharton School of the U niver
sity of Pennsylvania. A.B. Harvard; J .D ., LL.M. Duke. Research for this Arti
cle was generously supported by a grant from the Department of Legal Studies.
1 See Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis ofDiscourse, and
the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1393 (1996)
(predicting that institutionalism may bring a rapprochement between law and
economics and "outsider" schools such as femimst legal theory, which will cre
ate a unified theory for legal scholarship) .
2 See William J. Aceves, Institutionalist Theory and International Legal
Scholarship, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 227, 229 (noting the increasing use
of institutionalism in international law scholarship); see aLso infra notes 9-60
and accompanying text (discussing the use of institutionalism in international
law scholarship) .
3 See discussion infra notes 9-36 and accompanying text.
4 See discussion infra notes 36-60 and accompanying text.
•
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all of the social sciences are experiencing a revival in institutional
ism.) In particular, this Article examines two schools of institu
tionalism: historical institutionalism, 6 vvhich is a ?roduct of po
litical science; and sociological institutionalism, which is a
product of sociology. Each of these iterations of institutionalism
differs in critical ways from regime theory or institutional eco
nomics. Each also provides a rigorous framework for analyzing
international law and for scrutinizing the World Trade O rganiza
tion. To date, however, neither international law scholars nor
trade scholars have availed themselves of these tw o means of in
qmry.
This lack of use raises an interesting question, which is ana
lyzed in this A rticle: why have international law scholars and
trade scholars not utilized historical institutionalism or sociologi
cal institutio nalism? Ironically, historical and sociological institu
tionalism themselves p rovide insights. Historical institutionalism
emphasizes path dependency: a brief review of the unfolding of
institutional thought in international law scholarship reveals how
regime theory and institutional economics obtained an advantage
over rival schools. Similarly, sociological institutionalism empha
sizes cultural factors in the creation or alteration of institutions:
the culture of legal scholarship may not be conducive to these ver
sions of institutionalism.
The implications for both trade scholarship and the World
Trade Organization as institutions are significant. Understanding
why trade scholarship has not incorporated historical and socio
logical institutionalism may explain why trade scholarship has not
established linkages with other potentially instructive schools of
thought, such as business ethics. Moreover, understanding the
World Trade Organization as an institution 8 with a history and
embedded in culture may explain why practical linkages, such as

5 See Vivien Lowndes, Varieties of New Institutionalism: A Critical Ap
praisal, 74 PUB. ADMIN. 181, 18 1-82 (1996) (noting the revival in and plethora

of institutionalisms).
6
7

See discussion infra notes 62-90 and accompanying text.
See discussion infra notes 91-120 and accompanying text.

8 An institution not in the sense of an institute but rather as a bundle of
rules and procedures. See Douglass C. North, Institutional Change: A Frame
work for A nalysis, in SOCIAL RULES: ORIGIN; CHi\RACTER; LOGIC; CHA!'-JGE
189, 190 (David Braybrooke ed., 1996) (distin�uishing institutions-"the rdes
of the game" from organizations- "the players").
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the linkage between trade and human rights, are difficult to ac
complish.
Before discussing the possibilities that accrue from understand
ing the relationship between trade scholarship and historical and
sociological institutionalism, the current �linkage between trade
scholarship and institutionalism must be explained. This article
begins with a discussion of institutionalisms that have been used
to analyze the World Trade Organization.
1. INSTITUTIONALISM AND ANALYSIS O F THE WORLD TRADE
0RGANIZATION

Two iterations of institutionalism predominate in interna
tional law scholarship, and these two have resulted in the only
significant institutional analysis of international economic o rgani
zations such as the Y'// orld Trade Organization. These two are re
gime theory and institutional economics. Each is distinct from
the other, and each shall be discussed in turn.
1.1.

Regime Theory

Kenneth Abbott introduced the international relations school
of regime theory9 to international law scholarship in an article
published in the Yale Jowrnal of International Law in 1989.10 Ab
bott noted the schism between international relations theory and
international law theory, and attributed this schism to differences
in the theoretical approaches dominating each discipline. 1 1 Inter
national relations theory was, at that time, dominated by the
school of realism, which "see[s] a world of states obsessed with
9 Regime theory sometimes also uses the appellation "institutionalism."
John K. Setear, A n Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International
Relations Theory and International Law, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 139, 1 40 (1997) .
Given the number of different types of institutionalism that are discussed m
this Article, this Article will use the older appellation "regime theory" when
discussin£; international relations theory, so as to avoid confusion with other
types of mstitutionalism.
1
° Kenneth W. Abbott, Modem International Relations Theory: A Prospectus
for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335 (1989); see Anne-Marie
Slaughter [Burley], Book Review, 89AM J. INT'L L. 454, 454 (1 995) (reviewing

VOLKES RITTBERGER, REGilv1E THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

(1993)) (stating that Kenneth Abbott "first broached the connection between
regime theory and international law").
11
T BOYLE,
See Abbott, supra note 10, at 337-38; see also FRANCIS ANTHOl\.Y
WORLD POLITICS ;\ND INTERNATIONAL LAW 58-60 (1985) (discussing the
schism and criticizing international law scholarship).
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their power vis-a-vis other states," and in which international law
.
.
,,
•
1
1s mere
wmaow d ressmg. " 1 7- Internatwna1 l aw, on t h e ot h er
•

-

·

hand, was dominated by a rather moribund positivism, with a
goal to describe international law as it is rather than as a theoreti13
ca1 construct .
Abbott perceived the possibility of rapprochement between
international relations theory and international legal scholarship
in a new school of thought within the discipline of international
12

Abbott, supra note 10, at 337-38; see HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS
AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 4-5 (4th ed. 1967)

(arguin� that the only relevant law is the "law of politics") ; Richard A . Falk,
The Re.evance of Political Context to the Nature and Functioning of International
Law: A n Intermediate View, in THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
133, 138 (Karl W. Deutsch & Stanley Hoffman eds . , 1968) (criticizing interna
tional l aw as a "repository of legal rationalizations") ; see also Ann-Marie Slaugh
ter [Burley], L iberal International R elations Theory and International Econom ic
La'w, 10 AM. U. J . INT'LL. & POL Y 717, 721-22 (1995) (notin g that the realist
school dominated international relations theory for "virtually the past two mil
lennia, from Thucydides to Machiavelli to Morgenthau") .
Slaughter [Burley] summarizes realism in three principles: states are the
pertinent actors in international relations, states are rational actors who seek
power, and the organizing principle of international relations is anarchy. Id. at
722. She cautions, however, that t his simple summary does not fully capture
the complexities or varieties of the school of realism. !d. at 727. More fulsome
discussions can be found in classic realist texts such as GEORGE KENNAN,
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1 900-1 950 (195 1) or MORGENTHAU, supra.
13 Positivism in international law posits three principles:
all soverei g n
states are equal and independent, international law consists only of those rules
that states have consented to follow, and states are the only actors in the inter
national arena. See L. OPPENHEIMER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 20-2 1 (4th ed.
1 928) (setting out the principles of positivism in international legal scholarship) ;
H. Lauterpacht, Spinoza and International Law, 8 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 89, 1 0607 (1927) \Same) ; see also Sol Picciano, Networks in Intemational Econom ic Inte
gration: Fragmented States and the Dilemma of Neo-Liberalism, 17 J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 1 0 1 4, 1 0 1 8 (1996) (noting that both legal positivism and international rela
tions theory realism are state centered) . Positivism has long been castigated for
its detrimental effect on international legal theory. See, e.g. , Roscoe Pound,
Philosophical 17Jeory and International Law, I BIBLIOTECA VISSERIANA 73 , 87-88
(1923) Oaunching a blistering attack on fositivism in international legal scholar
ship/ ; Phillip R. Trimble, Internationa Law, World Order, and Critical Legal
Stuaies, 42 STAN. L. REV. 8 1 1 , 8 1 9 ( 1990) (decrying "sterile positivism" in inter
national law scholarship) . Nonetheless, positivism "still dominates the profes
s io n BOYLE, supra note 1 1, at 1 8 . David Kennedy notes the predominance of
positivism, but also calls attention to "new streams" of international law schol
arship. David Kennedy & C hris Tennant, New Approaches to International
Law: A Bibliography, 3 5 HARV. INT'L L.J. 417, 4 1 8 (1994) (noting "a dramatic
increase during t he past two decades in the volume of scholarly work that aims
to recent trends
to rethink the foundations of international law and to respond
"
in political, social, and legal theory").
'

."
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relations theory. That school of thought is regime theory. Re
gime theory originated as a reaction to an explanatory failure of
realism. Realism posits a chaotic and competitive world. 1 4 The
realist explanation for the existence of international organizations
in such a hostile environment is that such organizations are im
posed on other states by the most powerful states. 1 5 Under such a
construct, however, the decline of U.S. hegemony in the 1970s
and 1980s should have meant the end of international or g aniza
tions. However, it did not .16 This explanatory gap was filled by a
subgroup of international relations theorists who study interna
tional organizations .17 These subspecialists recognized that it is
not simply states that determine international outcomes; states
operate and interact through the rules and procedures of regimes.
These regimes are maintained by the states because they are valu
able to the states. They reduce the costs of making transactions
among states, i ncrease the quality and availability of information,
legitimize and delegitimize behaviors of states, and facilitate reci
procity among states. 1 8 In short, regimes matter, and offer an ana
lytic through which international behavior can be studied.
Abbott saw in regime theory "a long-overdue opportunity to
re-integrate [international legal scholarship] and [international re
lations theory] . " 1 9 International legal scholarship brings to there
lationship its experience in rules and institutions. International
relations theory, on the other hand, offers international legal
scholarship an analytic by which it can escape the "narrow posi14 See MORGENTHAU, supra note 12, at 25-26 (describing international
politics as "a struggle for power") .

15 ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND
DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 8-10 (1984) ("[F]or Realists . . .

the early p ostwar regimes rested on the political hegemony of the United
States.") ; see also Duncan S nidal , The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory, 39
I!'J"T'L ORG. 579 (1985) (setting out and refuting the realist hegemony explana
uon) .
16
See G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory:
A n A nalysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 859 (1995)
(pointing out that the GATT an d IMF continued to exen great influence afr:er
th e decline of U.S. hegemony) .
17 See Friedr i c h Kratochwil & John Gerard Ruggie, International Organiza
tion: A State of the A rt on an A rt of the State, 40 INT'L ORG. 753 (1986)
(recounting a history of the study of international organizations) .
18 KEOHAf,fE, supm note 15, at 244 (attributing accord to "comp iementary
interests, which make cert:iin forms of cooperation pote nt ially b e nefi c ial )
19 Ab bo tt supra note 10, at 338.
"

,
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tivism" in which it is trapped.20 Each school obviousiy has poten
tial benefits for the other.
Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley amolified Abbott's ideas in an
,.
2
article published in 1993. 1 Burley's approach is much different
than i\.bbott's. Abbott explains, in extreme detail, the concept
2
and mechanics of regime theory.2
Burley, on the other hand,
concentrates on a detailed intellectual history of the relationship
between international relations theory and international law
scholarship.23 Burley reaches two conclusions. First, she notes
that the convergence of regime theory and international law
scholarship creates opportunities for interdisciplinary collabora
tion.24 Second, Burley concludes that regime theory "remains
theoretically inadequate in many ways."b Specifically, she faults
regime theory for its inability to explain the creation of regimes,
and for its failure to account for the relationship between the in
2
dividual and the state. 6 She offers the "Liberal Theory" as a doc
trinal alternative to both realism/positivism and regime theory.27
20

!d. at 339-40.
See Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International
Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205 (1993). Burley's article
evokes a reaction similar to that elicited by Abbott's article. See, e.g. , Setear,
supra note 9, at 139 n . 1 (1997) (noting that Burley's article represents "the best
summary of the trends and counter-trends in the relationsh - between interna
tional relations theory and international legal scholarship" ; Richard L. Wil
liamson, Jr., Law and the H-Bomb: Strengthen ing the Nonpro iferation Regime to
Impede Advanced ProLiferation, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 7 1 , 76 n.8 (1 995)
(discussing Burley's article as "an excellent analysis of contemporary interna
tional relations theory").
72
- See Abbott, supra note 1 0, at 342-404.
23 See Burley, supra note 2 1 , at 207-20 (describing the 'postwar trajectory' of
international relations theory) .
24 See id. at 222. Specifically, Burley suggests collaboration on distinguish
ing legal regimes from nonlegal regimes, studying organizational design, study
ing the phenomenon of compliance with international rules, and undertaking a
normat1ve inquiry into international ethics. See id. at 222-24.
2 5 !d. at 225.
26
See id. at 225-26. Burley also specifically faults regime theory for its fail
ure to explain peace among democratic nations; this, however, is more an ex
ample of regime theory's weakness than a general criticism. See id.; see also
Bruce Russett, Politics and ALternative Security: Toward a More Democratic,
TheYefore More Peac�{ttl, World, in ALTERNATIVE SECURITY: LIVING WITHOUT
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE 107, 111 (Burns H . Weston ed. , 1990) (discussing a
number of studies that show that democratic nations rarely go to war with one
21

�

another).

.
77
'
- R
'
nur!ey, supra note 21, at 227. B uney
recogmzes t h.at t h1e sc h O<)J' ot- !!
"b eralism encompasses a number of constructs, but suggests that three core assump-
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l.,_yotwithstanding Burley's criticism, Abbott's suggestion that
international legal scholarship borrow from regime theo ry has
created a cottage industry in institutionalism. Scholars such as
Abbott, Burley, Jutta Brunnee and Stephen Toope, Frank Garcia,
John Setear, and Edwin Smith have used institutionalism to ex
plain and analyze a variety of public international law issues.28

Indeed, :Michael Reisman has characterized institutionalism as
. d S tates . " 29 I t 1s
. .1mportant to note,
. t h e Unlte
"t he current rage m
however, that although many legal scholars use the broad term in
stitutionalism, the roots of their analyses lie in the regime t heory
.
.
.
1 re 1 atwns. 3 0
o±- mternatwna

Regime theory has also been used to analyze the World Trade
Organization. In an article published in 1995, Richard Shell ex
tensively utilizes realism, regime theory and liberalism to scruti
nize the World Trade O rganization. 3 1 In particular, Shell uses re-

tions are common to the school: the fundamental actors in politics are mem
bers of society (whether individuals are privately constituted group s) , all gov
ernments represent some segment of domestic society, and the behavior of
states depends not on power relationships or institutional constraints but in
stead on what the state wants. See id. at 227-2 8 . Burley relies heavily on an un
published manuscript by Andrew Moravcsik. For accessible versions of
Moravcsik's writing, see Andrew Moravcsik, Preferences and Power in the Euro
pean Community: A Liberal Intergovernmenta fist A pproach, 3 1 J. COMMON
M.-KT. STUD. 473 (1993) , in which Moravcsik particularly applies the concept
that a state's actions are determined more by its gcals and preferences than by
relative power distributions among states or by mstitutional constraints upon
them, and Andrew Moravcsik, Liberal Interzovernmentalism and Integration: A
Rejoinder, 33 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 61 1 (1995) , in which Moravcsik defends
liber� ism as _a theory, and posits that it is necessary for understanding Euro
pean mtegratwn.
28
See Kenneth W. Abbott , "Trust But Verify": The Production of Infonna
tion in A nns Control Treaties and Other International Agreements, 26 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 1 (1993) ; Jutta Brunnee & Stephen J. Toope, Environmental Security
and Freshwater Resources: Ecosystem R egime Building, 9 1 AM . J. INT'L L. 26
(1997) ; Frank J. Garcia, Decision making and Dispute Resolution in the Free Trade
Area of the A mericas: A n Essay in Trade Governance, 1 8 MICH. J. INT'L L. 357
( 1997) ; Setear, supra note 9; Edwin M. Smith, Understanding Dynamic Obliga
tions: Anns Control Agreements, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 549 (1991) . The writings
of Abbott, Burley and Smith are summarized in Setear, supra note 9, at 1 42-47.
29 W. Michael Reisman, Book Review, 85 AM . J. INT'L L. 205, 206 (199 1).
30 Each of the scholars discussed in footnote 28 mention Abbott's 1989 ar
ticle as a starting point for institutional analysis . See Brunnee & Toope, supra
note 28, at 33 n.43; Garcia, supra note 28, at 361 n.1 5 , Setear, supra note 9, at
140 n.l; Smith, supra note 28, at 1584 n.156.
31 G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An
Andysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829 (1995) . Shell makes
explicit the line3.ge of his analysis by acknowledging his artide's "particular
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gime theory to explain one of the most intriguing aspects of the
\vorld Trade Organization: the potential legalism of its dispute
.
.
setLement
process. 32 I n an mterestmg
companson
an d app 1.1catwn
1
.
.
of both realism and regime theory, Shell explains the transforma-·
tion of dispute settlement in the global body as a paradigm shift

from realism to regime theory. He convincingly demonstrates
how this paradigm shift reflected real world changes that caused
states to transform, the dispute settlement process into a more le
galistic institution.-'3 Shell is not, however, completely satisfied
with regime theory as an explanation for the World Trade Or
ganization, because he finds regime theory lacking in its ability to
explain the relationship between institutions and the p references
of individuals. 34 Therefore, he accepts regime theory as an expla
nation of the World Trade Organization as it is but turns to liber
alism for an explan ation of the World Trade Organization as he
predicts, and hopes, that it w ill become.3 5 Shell's facile use o f the

debt to the work of Kenneth Abbott and Ann-Marie Slaughter [Burley]." !d. at
834 n.21.
32 The dispute settlement _process of the World Trade Organization has
evoked a significant amount of scholarly attention. See, e.g. , Kenneth W. Ab
bott, The Uruguay R ound and Dispute Resolution: Buildin g a Private-Interests Sys
tem of justice, 1992 C OLUM . Bus. L. REv. 111; Claudto Cocuzza & Andrea
Forabosco, A re States R elinqu ishing Their Sovereign R ights? The GA IT Dispute
Settlement Process in a Glo balized Economy, 4 TUL. J . INT'L & COMP. L. 161
(1996); Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard
of Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 AM . J . INT'L L. 193
(1996); Thom;:�.s J. Dillon, Jr., The World Trade Organization: A New Legal Or
der for World Trade?, 16 MICH. J . INT'L L. 349 (1995); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Insti
tutional Misfits: The GA IT, the IC], & Trade-Environment Disputes, 15 MICH. J .
INT'L L . 1043 (1994); David A . Gantz, A Post- Uruguay R ou nd Introduction to
International Trade Law in the United States, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 7,
129 (1995); David W. Leebron, A n Overview of the Uruguay R ound Results, 34
C O LUM . J. TRANSNAT'L L. 11, 14-16 (1995); Andreas F. L owenfeld R emedies
A long With R ights: Institutional Reform in the New GA IT, 88 AM. J. INT'L L.
477, 479 (1994); Philil? M. Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 Nw. U. L. REV.
658 (1996); Curtis Re1tz, Enforcement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 555 (1996); Matthew Schaefer, National Re
view of W'TO Dispute Settlement Reports: In the Name of Sovereignty or Enhanced
�VJO Rule Compliance?, 11 ST. JOHN'S J . LEGAL COMMENT . 307 (1996); C .
O'Neal Taylor, Th e L imits of Economic Power: Section 301 and the �Vorld Trade
Organization Dispute Settlement System, 30 VAND. J. TR.A.NSNAT'L L. 209
,

(1997).

33 See Shell, supra note 31, at 895-98. Shell also discusses an efficient market
model, which he discards in favor of regime theory. See id. at 897.
34 !d. at 90 1-903; cf supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text (relating to
Slaughter [Burley]'s criticism of regime theory) .
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three schools is an excellent example of theoretical international
lavr scholarship, and also demonst rates the value of a regime the
ory based analysis of the World Trade Organization .
In short, the essence of regime theory is that in international
or transnationae6 relations, regimes matter. Institutions facilitate
the prediction, planning and execution of international actions
and form the b asis on which states o r other international actors
may cooperate . . They constrain the actions of international ac
tors, who voluntarily adhere to institutions because it is easier or
more effective t o do so than not t o do so . Institutions p ersist i n a
self-interested world because they have value t o international ac
tors. As a theoretic framework, international law scholars have
borrowed from the regime theory . The use of regime t heory has
included analysis of the World T rade Organization, where regime
theory has been used productively and plausibly, but not t o the
complete satisfaction of the scholar who first applied it as an ana
lytical tool.

1.2.

Institutional Economics

The second form of institutionalism that has worked its way
into legal scholarship is institutional economics. Given the pre
dominance of law and economics and the nominal fealty paid by
most legal scholars to efficiency,37 it may not seem surprising t hat
economic institutionalism has found a niche in legal scholarship .
However, in the realm of international law, this development is
actually noteworthy. Unlike other branches of legal scholarship,

35 Shell, supra note 3 1 , at 9 1 1-15 (explaining an international law developed
by "citizen-sponsored, nongovernmental organizations") .
36 A small number of regime theorists argue that the theory is applicable to
non-state as well as state actors. See, e.g. , SUSAN STRANGE, STATES AND
MARKETS 200 ( 1988) ; Virginia Haufler, Crossing the Boundary Between Public
and Private International Regimes and Non-State A ctors, in REGIME THEORY
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 94 (Volker Rittberger ed. , 1993) ; see also
Philip M . Nichols, Realism, Liberalism, Values, and the World Trade Organiza
tion, 17 U. PA. T. INT'L ECON. L. 8 5 1 , 876-77 ( 1 996) (suggesting that interna
tional legal scho farship does not need to limit itself in the application of regime
theory to state actors) .
37 See Richard A. Westin, When One-Eyed A ccountants are Kings: A Primer
on ivficroeconomics, Income Taxes and the Shibboleth of Efficiency, 69 :MINN. L.
REV. 1099 ( 1985) (noting the use and overuse of economic concepts in legal
1
'
scl101arstup) .
•

•
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international law scholarship has not been the subject of large
.
. 38
amounts o f economic ana1 ys1s .
39
Institutional economics is a response to a perceived flaw in
neo-classical economics. Neo-classical economics bases its theo
retical models on the actions of rational individuals who act to
40
maximize their own well-being (often spoken of as wealth).
In
reality, however, consumption decisions are usually made b,x
households and production decisions are usually made by firms. 1
38

See Abbott, supra note 10, at 337. Abbott attributes this to the predomi
nance of positivism in international legal analysis and the corresponding lack of
interest in explanatory models. Id. Of course, the analytical landscape is not as
bleak as Abbott depicts . In addition to the use of institutional economic analy
sis, others have explored the usefulness of economic analysis of international
law. See, for example, the essays collected in ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Alan 0. Sykes eds . , 1 997).
39 Institutional economics is sometimes referred to as "neo-institutional
economics" in order to distinguish it from the earlier works of Thorstein Ve
blen and John R. Commons. See Douglass C. North, The New Institutional
Economics, 1 42 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 230 (1986). Ironi
cally, the earlier institutional economics also had a powerful influence on con
temporary legal theory. See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1 9271960 19 (1986) (discussing the influence of institutional economics, and of Ve
blen in particular, on legal realism) .
40 See Thomas F . Cotter, Legal Pra � matism and the Law and Economics
Movement, 84 GEO. L.J. 2071 , 2 1 1 5 (1996). These assumptions, of course, have
been criticized as inaccurate, unverified, or unverifiable. See, e.g. , id. at 2117-18
(statin g that the assumptions made by the law and economic movement are un
verifiable and unfalsif1able) ; John J . Donahue III & Ian Ayres, Posner's Sym
phony No. 3: Thinking A bout the Unthinkable, 39 STAN . L. R EV. 79 1 , 812 (1987)
(criticizing law and economic's "clean assumptions") ; John J. Flyn, The "Is" and
the "Ought" of the Vertical Restraints After Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service
Corp. , 7 1 CORNELL L. REV. 1095, 1 128-29 (1 986) (stating that law and econom
ics "patterns its methodology after an outmoded notion of 'scientific analysis'"
and is based "upon a series of unrealistic notions") ; Judith Schenck KoHler,
Forged A lliances: Law and Literature, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1 374, 1382 (1989)
(book review) ("law and economics rests on assumptions about human nature
�hat many, especially trained humanists, find disturbi.r:f) ; Nancy Levit, Listen
mg to Tnbal Legends: A n Essay on Law and the Snentzjzc Method, 58 FORDHAM
L. REV. 263, 285 (1989) ("Many assumptions of normative law and economics
are either untested or called into doubt by empirical testing.") . But see Herbert
Hovenkamp , Rationality in Law and Economics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. RE V . 293,
293 (1992) �responding to some of the criticisms of law and economics' assump
rions) . Radical individualism has also been the target of criticism by legal
ethicists. See, e.g. , Thomas Shaffer, The Legal Ethics ofRadical Individualism, 65
TEX. L. REV. 963 (1987) (arguing that the organic community has priority over
individuality) .
41 See Robert B . Bates, Social Dilemmas and Rational Individuals, in
ANTHROPOLOGY AND INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 43, 44 Qames M. Acheson
ed., 1994) ("Given the centrality of radical individualism, it has been pro-
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Neo-classical economics is forced to treat these collectives as if
they were .individuals and to ignore the process that occurs within
'
. t h eothe co11 ect1ve. 42 Ul t1mate 1 y, sue h "b.lac k oox " treatment 1s
retically unsatisfying. Institutional economics is one aspect of the
resulting interest in how individual choices are made.43
The school of institutional economics has not yet sorted out
its principles. 44 Nonetheless, its basic assumptions and theory can
be described. Institutional economics begins with the individual ,
whose behavior is opportunistically rational-"rational" meaning
that the individual seeks to maximize his or her wealth and to
minimize costs. Rationality, however, is bounded by the infor
mation that is available. 45 Obtaining info rmation imposes trans
action costs on actors. 4 6 Institutions facilitate the gathering and
communication of information, thereby reducing transaction
costs. 47 Indeed, "[ t]he discriminating alignment hypothesis to
which transaction cost economics owes much of its predictive
content holds that transactions, which differ in their attributes,
are aligned with governance structures, which differ in their costs
and competencies, in a discriminating (mainly, transaction cost
. .
,
econom1zmg) way. 4 8
,

.

foundl y embarrassing to modern economics that in its models market forces did
not rest on the choice of individuals.").
42

See

The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS
3 , 1 5 (1953) (defending "as if" arguments).
43 Bates, supra note 41, at 45.
4 4 See James M . Acheson, Introduction, in ANTHROPOLOGY AND IN
STITUTIONAL ECONOMICS, supra note 4 1 , at 1 , 6 ("Institutional economics is
Milton Friedman,

IN POSITNE ECONOMICS

moving so rapidly that no commonly agreed set of principles has emerged.").
45

See MARY DOUGLAS.

198 (1992)

RISK AND BLA�"Iv!E: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL THEORY

(stating that inst{tutional economics "characterizes individuals in the
marketplace as weakly rational and weakly moral").

46 See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS
AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 3 1-32 (1975) (stating that obtaining informa

tion is one of the most important transaction costs). Carl Dahlman identifies
the time, effort and expense of obtaining the "information necessary to make an
exchan & e, negotiate the exchange and enforce the exchange" as trar;sact�on
Extetrt.ahty, 22 J. L. & ECON. 1 4 1, 149
costs. �ee Cart Dahlman, The Problems

(197 � .

of

4
Anthony Obershall & Eric M. Leifer, Efficiency and Social Institutions:
Uses and Misuses of Economic Reasoning in Sociology, 12 ANN. REV. Soc. 233,
237 4\1906
8 1�·
.
r
.
.
�'I
.
F
1ver x:.
1 1amson, Comparatlve
�conomrc
;Jrganzzatwn:
j r;e A natyszs
rc W"ll"
of DiscreteStructuralAltematives, 36ADMIN. SCI. Q. 269,277 (1991).
r
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Thus, a n understanding of t h e relationship between transac
tion costs and inst ituti ons is thought to be critical -co an under
stan d ing of economic exchange, the existence of institut ions, and
the existence of international institutions. + 9 lV1oreover j institu
tional economics predicts that individuals will seek out and utilize
i nstitut ions that minimize transaction costs, and m ay endeavor t o
50
create alternative institutions if suitable institutions do n o t exist.
Institutional economics has been criticized in a number o f
ways ? One criticism deals with t h e assumption that rat ional be
havior is self-centered. In his writing, A martya Sen has n ot ed that
52
"[t]he economic m an is a social moron."
Other social scientists
also criticize institut io nal economics' humans as "under social
ized" and point out that economic relations are s haped by a multi
tude of cultural interests that have nothing to do with self
53
interest .
Indeed, some institutional economist s feel that their

49 See T HRAIN EGGERTSSON, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS:
PRlNCil'ALS OF NEO-INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (1990) ; NEIL KOMESAR,
IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS
AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994) ; Bruno Frey, The Economic Approach to Institutions:
fnsritutions Matter: The Comparative A nalysis of Institutions, 34 EUR. ECON.
REV. 443 (1990) ; Werner Pommerehne, The Empirical Relevance of Comparative
Institutional A nalysis, 34 EUR. ECON. REV. 458 (1990) ; Beth V. Yarbrough &
Robert M. Yarbrough, International Organizations and the New Economics of
Organizations, 44 INT'L ORG. 235 (1990) (book review) .
50 See Douglass C . North, lnstitutional Change: A Framework ofA nalysis, in
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: THEORY AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 35, 35-46
(Sven-Erik Sjostrand ed., 1 993) (discussing theory of institutional change) ; An
drew Stone et al. , Public Institutions and Private Transactions: A Comparative
A nalysis of the Legal and Regulatory Environment for Business Transactions in
Brazil and Chile, in EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 95, 98100 (Lee Alston et a! . eds . , 1 996) (discussing and applying theory of institutional
chanpe) .
5
An emotional response to the general criticism is found in WILLIAM M.
DUGGER, UNDERGROUND ECONOMICS: A DECADE OF INSTITUTIONALIST
DISSENT xviii (1992) ("So our realism will continue to be a t hreat to academic
complacency as long as the real world exists, for the real world is insistent and
can push its surprises into the most cloistered of academic sanctuaries.") . The
responses of Ronald Coase (1991), Gary Becker (1992) and Douglass C. North
(1993) to general critics of institutional economics were less emotional but
pr?bably more effective: each of these institutional economists won the Nobel
pnze.
52 Ama � ya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations
ofEconomzc Fheorj, 6 PI-T..IL. & PUB. AFF. 336, 336 (1977) .
53 Mark Granovetter, Economic A ction and Social Structure: A Theory of
Ernbededness, 9 1 AM. J. Soc. 4 8 1 , 502-05 (1985) .
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discipline can only overcome these barriers by borrowing from
othe� social sciences. 54
Despite these criticisms, many social sciences have found the
transaction cost analysis contained in institutional economics to
be valuable. The law and economics movement has an obvious
interest in this school of thought. 55 Indeed, Ronald Coase' s trans
action cost explanation for the existence of firms has become t he
dominant paradigm in corporate legal theory . 5 6
54 See Bates, supra note 4 1 , at 54-59 (calling for a "new anthropology") ; see
also Christian Knudsen, Equilibrium, Perfe ct Rationality and the Problem of Self
Reference in Econom ics, in RATIONALITY, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC
METHODOLOGY 1 3 3 , 1 34 (Uskali Maki et al. eds . , 1 993) (arguing that solving
basic problems in institutional economics "seems to require a broadening of the
behavioural foundation of economics insofar as one has to emphasize not only
the substantive, but also the procedural and the epistemic aspects of rational
ity") . But see Thrain Eggerston, A Note on the Economics of Institutions, in
EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, supra note 50, at 6, 1 7-20
(defending the assumption of self-interested, rational behavior) .
55 See generally Steven G . Medema, Discourse and the Institutional Approach
to Law and Economics: Factors that Separate the Institutional Approach to Law
and Economics from A lternative Approaches, 23 J. ECON. ISSUES 4 1 7 ( 1989) ;
Richard Posner, The New Institutional Economics Meets Law and Economics, 149
J . INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 73 (1993) .
56 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory Management within a Theory of
the Firm, 21 J . CORP. L. 657, 659 (1996) (stating that economic theories are
"now the dominant paradigm in corporate law") ; Ronald H. Coase, The Nature
of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 3 8 6 ( 1 937) , reprinted in RONALD H. COASE, THE
FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 33 ( 1988); Aleta G. Estreicher, Beyond
Agency Costs: Managing the Corp oration {or the Long Term, 45 RUTGERS L. REV.
5 1 3 , 5 1 5 ( 1 993) (stating that offspring of Coase's analysis "still reigns supreme in
the academic literature") ; Jason S. Johnston, The Influence of the Nature of the
Firm on the Theory of Corporate Law, 1 8 J . CORP. L. 2 1 3 , 2 1 3 (1993) (stating that
Coase's theory dominates theoretical work in corporate law) . Oliver WiTliam
son has expanded Coase's original theory in a manner that has particular appli
cation to mstitutional economics. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION: FIR.M: S, MARKETS AND POLICY CONTROL (1986) ; Oliver E.
Williamson, Economics and Organizations: A Primer, 38 CAL MGMT. REV. 13 1
(1996) .
It should be noted that the dominance o f Coase's theory o f firms does not
mean that there is only one economic model of firms. Michael Jensen and Wil
liam Meckling, for example, define a firm not in terms of agency costs but in
stead as a "nexus for contracting relationships." Michael C. Jensen & 'Yiilliam
H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and OwneY
ship Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 3 1 1 (1 976) . But see William W. Bratton, Jr.,
The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV.
407, 4 15 (1989) (criticizing Jensen and Meckling's and related theories) . Oliver
Hart, on the other hand, emphasizes not contracts but instead the ownership of
property by the firm . See OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FI
NANCIAL STRUCTURE 57 (1995) . Other economists proffer an employment

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U.
� T "pa.

4 74

J. In t ., _.__r:con. L .
,

[Vol 1 9 : 2

Joel T rachtman has used institutional economics as the foun
dation fo r com p arison of international economic o rganizations,
including the World Trade Organization. Trachtman hypot he
sizes that "states use and desi gn international i nstitutions to
maximize the members' net gains , '' which are the gains from ,a
transaction minus the losses from and costs of that transaction. ) 7
Trachtman makes the important distinction between the markets
58
to which institutional ec ; nomics is usually applied and the in
ternational arena: the commodities exchanged in the i nterna.
"59
"
.
'
1 a1 1 ocatwn
twna1 arena are agreements regard mg
tne
o f power.
After thoroughly working through the details of i nstitutional
economic theory and applying them to international economic
o rganizations, T rachtman concludes that, although additional
theoretical and empirical work needs to be done, i nstituti o nal
economics p rovides a useful means of scrutinizing and comparing
international economic organizations . The metric for scruti ny
and comparison, in Trachtman ' s theory, is how efficient an inter
national economic organization is in maximizing states' p refer
ences. 60 T rachtman 's excell ent analysis illustrates the p otential of
an i nstitutional economic analysis of the \Xl orld Trade O rganiza
tiOn.
In short , inst itutional economics uses instituti o ns t o explain
the act ions of rational, self-interested act o rs . These actors create
or modify institutions on the basis of the extent to which the in
stitutions enhance efficiency in obtaining the act o rs' p references.
Instituti onal economics has influenced legal scholarship, and w i l l
probably make inroads in i nternat ional law scholarship. Indeed,
it has been used as an analytic for t he comparison of international
economic organizations such as the World Trade O rganization.
theorv of the fir m . See, e.g. , Samuel B owles & Herbert Gintis, Con tested Ex·
chang�: New Microfoundations for the Politica { Econom y of.Capitalism, 1 8 PoL. &
Soc. 1 6 5 (1 990) ; Bengt Holstrom & Paul M1lgro m , The Fz nn as an Incen tzve Sys
tem , 84 AM ECON. REV. 972 (1 994) ; Louis Putterman, Ownership and the Na
.
ture . the Firrn., 1 7 J. COMP. ECON. 243 ( 1 993) .

?j

' Joel P . Trachtman, The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of the In terna
tionaL Economic Organ ization: Toward Comparati1..o·e Institutio naf A nalysis, 1 7
Nw. J . Irn'L L. e{. Bus. 470, 473-74 (1 997) . The statement o bviously resonat es
with aspects of regim e theory i n that i nstitutions are designed by their users
and serve ratio nal , m eans-end utilities.
58

59

T hat is, the market for goods or services .

Trachtman, suora note 57, ac 487. Trachtman no tes that in l egal analvsis
)
power is called jurisd�ction. See id. at 49 8 .
be

See id.

at

555.
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A LTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONALISM$: HISTORJCAL

lt,ISTITUTIONALISM AND SOCIOLOGICAL INSTITUTIONALISM

To label historical institutionalism and sociological institu
t ionalism as "alternative" forms of institutionalism may be some
what misleading. Both are firmly established schools of thought
in other disciplines: historical institutionalism has been a part of
political science since the 1960s and sociological institutionalism
h as been a growing part of sociology for almost as long. 6 1 The
term "alternative" is used in this Article only to emphasize that
these schools of thought have not yet been mined by international
legal scholarship .
Because some legal scholars may be unfamiliar with either his
torical or sociological institutionalism, each is briefly discussed in
the following subsections.

2. 1.
2. 1.1.

Historical Institutionalism and Sociological
Institutionalism
Historical Institutionalism

62
Historical institutionalism is a reaction to and extension of
the group theory and structural functionalist approaches t o po
litical science that dominated the 1 960s and 1 9 70s. Group theory
emphasizes power and conflict, arguing that politics is a balancing
"of various forces contending for power and the making of deci
63
sions . "
Structural functionalism compares social entities to o r61

An esp ecially informative discussion of historical and sociological insti
tutionalism from which this Article benefits substantially is Peter A. Hall &
Rosemary C. R. Taylor, Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms, 49
POL STUD. 936 (1996) .
62 Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo use the appellation "historical insti
tutionalism." See Kathleen Thelen & Sven Steinmo, Historical Institutionalism
in Comparative Politics, in STRUCTURING POLITICS: HISTORICAL INSTI
TUTIONALISM IN COMPARi\TIVE ANALYSIS 1 , 2 (Kathleen Thelen & Sven Ste
inmo eds . , 1992) . They, in turn, attribute the phrase to Theda Skopcol. See id.
at 28 n.4. It is not always identified as such by members of the school.
6 3 RONALD H. CHILCOTE, THEORlES OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS: THE
SEARCH FOR A PARADIGM 35 (198 1) . Obviously , group theory cannot be
summarized in one sentence. A chapter length exp lanation of group theory can
be found in JAMES A. BILL & ROBERT L HARDGRAVE, JR., COMPARATIVE
POLITICS: THE QUEST FOR THEORY 1 1 7- 1 4 1 (1973) . In particular, "[g]roup
scholars view the political system as a gigantic network of groups in a constant
state of interaction with one another. This interaction takes the form of pres
sures and counterpressures, the outcome of which defines the state of the politi-
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6
ganic entities, 4 and by studying how structures work together,
tries "to provide a consistent and integrated theory from which
can be derived explanatory hypotheses relevant to all aspects" of a
65
given system.
From group theory, historical institutionalism
cal system at any given time." !d. at 120. Moreover, "[i]n an attempt to un
cover the 'real' or 'basic' forces of political life, group scholars ruthlessly cut
through the formal and institutional trappings of government and focus[] their
attent10n uron structures of competition." !d. at 1 3 4 . Bill and Hardgrave at
tribute the mtroduction of concepts such as "power," "interest," and "conflict"
into mainstream political science to group theorists. Jd. at 1 34-3 5 ; see John G.
Gunnell, The Genealogy ofA merican Pluralism: From Madison to Behavioralism,
13 lNT'L POL. SCI. REV. 253 (1997) (discussing the influence of group theory on
political science) ; cf CHILCOTE, supra, at 350 (giving John Locke, Jeremy Ben
tham, and James Madison credit for providing the Intellectual basis for group
theory) . Group theory continues to dominate American political science. See
Paul H. Brietzke, A dministrative Law and Development: The A merican "Model"
Evaluated, 26 How. L. J. 645, 659 ( 1 9 83) ; see, e.g. , Marie Hojnacki, Interest
Groups ' Decisions to Join A lliances or Work A lone, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 6 1 (1 997)
(usin_p group theory concepts).
6
Cf A.R. RADCLIFFE-BROWN, STRUC11JRE AND FUNCTION IN PRIM
ITIVE SOCIETY 1 7 8 (1952) (stating that the understanding of social function is
based on "an analogy between social life and organic life").
65 William
Flanigan & Edwin Fogelman, Functional A nalysis, in
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL ANALYSIS 72, 76 (Tames C. Charlesworth ed. ,
1967) . Again, this school o f thought cannot be fufly explicated in one sentence.
For a longer treatment, see BILL & HARDGRAVE, supra note 63 , at 2 0 1 - 1 7; see
also CHIL COTE, supra note 63 , at 1 62-82 (analyzing the work of Gabriel Al
mond, an important early figure in structural functionalism) . In particular,
structural functionalists perce1ve society as "a tightly integrated system of inter
related elements or structures. These structures exist because they perform
functions: one can explain various structures . . . by discoverir:_g their func
tion." David M. Trubek, Back to the Future: The Short, Happy L ije of the Law
and Society Movement, 1 8 FLA. ST. U . L. REV. 4, 32 (1990) . Analytically, "[t]he
principal objective of functional analysis is to determine the contribution
which a social item (a structure or process) makes to the persistence of the sys
tem in which it occurs, that is, the role it plays in maintaining the system
within specified limits. " BILL & HARDGRAVE, supra note 63, at 203 . The most
glaring weakness of structural functionalism is its requirement that all systems
perform functions: in reality there are many dysfunctional systems. See John
H. Schlegel, The Ten Thousand Dollar Question, 4 1 STAN. L. REV. 435, 445
(1989) (book review) (attributing the demise of structural functionalism to the
discovery of dysfunctional systems) . Given these and other explanatory weak
nesses, the predominance of structural functionalism has waned. SeeNICHOLAS
C. MULLINS, THEORIES AND THEORY GROUPS IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY 66-67 (1 973) (stating that structural functionalism
stopped being the majority view in 1968) . Nonetheless, structural functional
ism continues to exert influence on political science. See Ruth Lane, Structural
Functionalism Reconsidered: A Proposed Research Model, 26 COMP. POL. 4 6 1
(1 994) (advocating use of the structural functionalist model for theoretical re
search) ; Susan A. Mann et al., Paradigm Shifts in Fam ily Sociology? Evidence
from Three Decades of Family Textboo ks, 18 J. FAM. ISSUES 3 1 (1997) (arguing
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draws the concept of rivalry; from structural functionalism , his
torical instituti onalism draws an image of the polity as an i nte
grated system. The primary difference between historical institu
tionalism and its intellectual fo rebears is that while structural
functionalists often argued that external factors drive the func
tioning of a system, historical institutionalists hold that the sys
tem stnlctures collective behavior and t hus shapes ext ernal
66
events.
Historical institutional ists perceive institutions as the formal
or informal rules or procedures embedded in a formal o rganiza
tion. Peter Hall defines i nstitutions as
the formal nlles, compliance procedures , and standard op
erating practices t hat structure the relationship between
individuals in various units of the polity and economy. As
such, they have a more formal status than cultural norms
but one that does not necessarily derive from legal , as op
posed to conventional, standing. . . . [T]he term " organ
ization" will be used here as a virtual synonym for
.
.
, 7
.
" mstttutwn. 6

Because historical institutionalism has not yet coalesced as a
doctrinal school, it is difficult to summarize in a few short para
graphs; nonetheless, some of the basic characteristics of historical
institutionalism can be highlighted. The most striking, and per
haps definitive, characteristic of this school of thought is its em
phasis on the historical "path" taken by an institution i n its crea
tion and development. 6 8 These pathways are marked by critical

that structural functionalism is so deeply embedded in political science dis
course that it continues to govern significant issues and debates).
66

H all & Taylor, supra note 6 1 , at 937.
PETER A. HALL, GOVERNING THE ECONOMY: THE POLITICS OF STATE
INTERVENTION IN BRITAIN AND FRANCE 1 9 (1 986) .
68
See Seymour M. Lipset & Stein Rokkan, Cleavage Structures, Party Sys
tems, and Voter A lignments: A n Introduction, in PARTY SYSTEMS AND VOTER
ALIGNMENTS: CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 1 , 37 (Seymour M. Lip set &
Stein Rokkan eds . , 1967) . Paul David refers to this as"path dependent" change.
Paul A. David, Clio and the Econom ics of Q WER TY, 75 AM. ECON. REV.
P.APERS & PROC. 332, 332 (1985) . Path dependency, of course, has become an
67

analytical tool used by other social sciences, albeit in slightly different forms.
Path dependency has even been used in purely legal analysis. See Maxwell L.
Stearns, Standing and Social Choice: Historical Evidence, 144- U. PA. L . REV. 309
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junctures, or cleavages, which present new paths or opportunities
for change . "A critical juncture may be defined as a period of sig
nificant change, which typically occurs in distinct ways in differ
ent countries and which is hypothesized to produce distinct lega
cies . " 69
A critical juncture is measured against a baseline of
antecedent conditions . Ruth Collier and David Collier explain
that t here are three claims made of a purported critical j uncture :
that significant change took place, that the change took place i n a
70
distinct way, and that the change produced a legacy .
The legacy
is critical to historical institutionalism because it b ecomes the new
antecedent condition, conditions what choices can be made at fu
ture critical junctures , and determines the range of choices t hat
71
can be made on a day to day basis .
Stephen Krasner makes ex
plicit this core assumption of historical institutional ists :
Historical developments are path dependent; o nce cert ai n
choices are made, they constrain future possibilities. The
range of options available t o policymakers at any given
point in time is a function of institutional capabi l ities that
were put in place at some earlier period, possib ly in re.
7?
.
sponse to very d t._fferent env1ronmental pressures. Historical institutionalists emphasize the role o f power, com
petition, and coalitions in analyzing how an institution operates.
This, of course, is a legacy of historical institutionalism's group
theory roots . lY1argaret Weir's discussion of U . S . economic policy

(1995) (using path dependency to analyze standing) ; Ma..xweli L Stearns, Stand·
ing Back From the Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1 309
(1995) (using path dependency to analyze j usticiability) .
69 RUTH BERINS COLLIER & DAVID COLLIER, SHAPING THE POLI"DCAL
ARENA: CRITICAL JUNCTURES, THE LABOR MOVEMENT, AND REGIME
DYNAMICS IN LATIN AMERICA 29 (199 1) (footnote omitted) .
70 See id. at 30. Collier and Collier also break the legacy down into three
components: "mechan isms ofproduction of the legacy," "[m ]echanisms of repro
duction of the legacy," and "stability of the core attributes of the legacy. " !d. at 303 1 . Each of these attributes bears directl l on whether the purported legacy is in
fact a legacy, that is, whether the critica juncture effectuated a real and lasting
chan p e in extant conditions. See id.
7
Cf JAMES GLICK, CHAOS 8 (1987) (emphasizing the "sensitive depend
ence on initial conditions") .
.
.
T r asner, soverezgnty:
�
h
D. T
7 -? ;)tep.1en
I 1Jerspectzve,
c
A n Instztutzona.
.
1\..
2 1 COMP.
POL. STuD. 66, 67 (1988) .
.
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is a striking example of t his preoccupation. She demonstrates that
the structure of the political system leads to certain types of coali.
73
'tlons and p recludes others.
Historical inst itutional ism exhibits a nonparochial approach
w the causal forces in politics. Although the role of institutions is
emphasized and thoro-ughly explored) -it is not gi v e n an exclusive
role. "They typically seek to locate institut ions in a causal chain
that accommodates a role for other factors , notably socioeco
nomic development and the diffusion of ideas . In this respect,
they posit a world that is more complex than the world of tast�s
and institutions often postulated by" self-interest based theories.14
An example t hat is of particular pertinence to this A rticle is an
analysis by Judith Goldstein) in ·which she demonstrates that the
structure for formulating trade policy i n the United States rein
forces the influence of certain types of ideas and diminishes the
i nfluence of others; the ideas t he mselves are significant factors in
5
.
pro d ucmg
t h e outcome. 7
Similarly, historical i nstitutionalism does not posit one exclu
6
sive means by which institutions affect individual behavior. 7
I-Iall and Taylo r set out two competing theories of how institu
tions affect behavior: the calculus approach and the cultural ap
proach. 77 The calculus approach assumes that behavior is strate
gic. According to the calculus approach, institutions "provide
information relevant to the behavior of others, enforcement
mechanisms for agreements, penalties for defection, and the
.l.

•

1

73

See

...

Margaret Weir,

Ideas

and

the Politics of Bounded

Innova tion , in

COMPARATIVE

STRUCTURING POLITICS: HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM IN
supra note 62, at 1 8 8 ;
SVEN STEINMO, TAXATION AND
DEMOCRACY: SWEDISH, BRITISH AND AMERICAN APPROACHES TO Fr.
N .A.. N CING THE MODERN STATE (1993) (explaining cross-country differences i n

ANALYSIS,

see also

tax systems b y examining t h e way t hat political structure affects access to-and
t herefore power over-the political decisio nmaking system) .
-4

'

Hall & Taylor, supra note 6 1 , at 942.

See Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Institutions and A merican Trade Policy, 42
INT'L 0RG . (, 1 9 8 8) .
7 6 Hall and T aylor state: "Central t o any i nstitutional analysis is the ques
tiOn: how do institutions affect the behaviour of i ndividuals? After all, it is
through the action of individuals that inst itutions have an effect on political
questions . " Hall & Taylor, supra note 6 1 , at 939. It s hould b e recalled t hat
both Burley and Shell criticize regime theor·y for its inabiEty to explain how
institutions relate to indiv iduals. See supra notes 26 & 33 and accompanying
75

text .

77

See Hall

& Taylor, s.wpn!

note
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actors.
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.
.1v1dua
tlona 1y and pers1st because t h ey are use ful to m d .
.
1
b
1
.
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T ne cultura.] approach recogmzes tnat enavwr 1s purpose fu'1 ,
but emphasizes the fact -chat i t i s bounded b y esta b lished routines,
existing patterns , and worldviews . 80 According t o the cultural
approach, inst itutions "provide mo ral or cognitive templates for
interpretation and act ion . "8 1 Institutions thus allow an individual
to filter and make meanin gful the morass of information not only
concerning the situation, but also concernin g the individual him.
1
1 82
-,
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.
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Id.
See Randall L. Calvert, The Rational Choice Theory of Socia! Institutions,
in MODERN POLITICAL E C ONOMY 2 16, 2 1 6 (Teffrey S. Banks & Eric A. Ha
nushek eds . , 1 995) ; see also Kenneth A. Shepsfe, Institutional Equililrrium and
Equilibrium Institutions, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE SCIENCE OF POLITICS 5 1 ,
74-75 (Herbert F . Weisberg ed. , 1986) (arguing that individuals are hesitant to
alter institutions even for short term gam because change creates a great deal of
future uncertainty) . This analysis is similar to that of the institutiOnal econo
mist Douglass C . North. See North, supra note 8, at 1 89 .
80
See, e.g. , John L. Campbell, The State and Fiscal Sociology, 19 ANN . REV.
Soc. 163, 1 64 (1 993) (acknowledging t hat rational incentives are important but
stating that cultural restraints are equally important) .
81
Hall & Taylor, supra note 6 1 , at 939.
82
See James G. March & Johan P . Olsen, The New Institutionalism: O-rgan
izational Factors in Political Life, 78 AM . P o L SCI. REV. 734, 738 (1984) . A
study conducted in Hungary provides interesting, and unintentional, empirical
veritication of this construct. The study found that a change in institutions,
specifically, the advent of advertising, changed the manner in which individual
Hungarians exp �essed their cultural identit . See Beverly James, L-?aming to
Consume: A n Ethnographzc Study of Cultura J Change zn Hungary, 12 CRITICAL
STUD. M.A.SS COMM. 287 (1995) .
8 3 See ROBERT GRAFSTEIN, INSTITUTIONAL REALISM: SOCIAL AND
POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS ON RATIONAL ACTORS (1992) . Interestingl y , some
legal scholars have made the same o bservation about the relationship between
law and society: that law is defined by, but at the same time defines, society.
Mary Ann Glendon, in particular, has explored this aspect of law. See f.IIA.R.Y
A NN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 3 1 1 (1989) ("A
country's law . . . both affects and is affected by the culture in which it
arises . . . ") ; see also Kristian Miccio, In the Name of Mothers and Children: De
constructing the Myth of the Passive Battered Mother and the "Protected Child " in
Child Neglect Proceedings, 58 ALB . L. REV. 1087, 1 087 (1995) ("Law shapes and
defines who we are as a culture while reinforcing the belief system that under
girds it . ") ; Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE
L.J. 56, 83 (1 993) ("The law is a powerful conceptual-rhetorical, discursive
force. It expresses conventional understandin�s of value, and at the same time
influences conven�ional understandings of value. ") ; Lawrence Rosen, A Con79

.
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Regime theory and institutional economics b oth clearly postu
late a calculus app roach to explore the relationship between indi
viduals and inst itutions . Historical institutionalists, on the other
h r 1
·
or tnese approach.es . 84 A stn·k·mg examp 1 e 1s
1h an d , h ave use d. 1oot
Victoria Hattam 's analysis of labor movements. In discussing the
U . S . labor move m e n t , she speaks of the movement analyzing and
adopting or avoiding certain strategies--i n particular, moving
away from strategie,s that were susceptible to review by the en
t renched judiciary . 8 ) On the other hand, when comparing the
U . S . labor movement to the British labor movement, she con
trasts the different institutions available to each movement , and
discusses how t hese i nstitutions created different worl dviews t hat
8
led to different actions. 6

Historical institutionalisrn qua historical institutionalism 8 7 h as
made virtually no inroads into legal scholarship. Ronald Kahn,
who is educated as a political scientist rather t han as a l awyer, re
cently published an article on presidential appoint ment power
that explicitly suggests histori cal institutionalism as a valuable
model for legal scholarship. 88 Kahn particularly emph as izes his
torical institutionalism's ability to describe and i nterpret the roles
1
.
ana cooperatiOn . 8 9 Txl"\.. a h n ' s admomt10n, h owo f power, confl.lCt,
ever, has not been heeded by legal scholarship . In fact, Kahn
chided his fellow panelists in the symposium from which his arti
cle was published for not taking advantage of historical inst itu.
90
l 1sm.
.
twna
•

•

•

·

·

sumer's Gt-tide to Law and the Social Sciences, 100 YALE L.J . 53 1 , 542 (1990)
(book review) ("[L]aw is preeminently an artifact of culture: it is influenced by
and constitutive of the way in which the members of a society comprehend
their actions towards one another and infuse those actions with an air of im
manent and superordinate worth.") .
84
See Hal l & Taylor, supra no � e 6 1 , at 940.
85 See VICTORIA C. HATTAlv1 , LABOR VISIONS AND STATE POWER: THE
ORIGINS OF BUSINESS UNIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES (1993) .
86
See id. at 1 80-203.

87 That is, h istorical institutionalism as a school of t hought rath:.; r than the
simple concept of path dependency.
"Kg See Ronald C. Kahn, Presidential Power and the Appointments Process:

Structuralism, Legal Scholarship, and the New Historical Institutionalism, 47 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 1 4 1 9 , 1 449-50 (1997) .
89 See id. at 1 446. Kahn relies heavily o n Stephen Skowronek, Order and
Change, 28 POLITY 9 1 (1 995) .
90

See Kahn, supra note 8 8 ,

at

1 4�· 5 .
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thought within the realm of political science . The definitive char
acteristic of historical institutionalism-an
attenuated path de'
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b
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1
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pen cl.ency-has , een u s e ,.. m otner soe1a. soences, mcmmng lega
scholarship . Historical institutionalism as a whole, however, has
not been -imported into legal scholarship o r international la·w
•
•
• •
•
1
r
1
schola rsh1p m tne manner or regime tneory or mst1tutwnal economics . In particular, no legal sch o l ar has used histo rical i nstitu
tionalism as a model for critically analyzing the World Trade O r
gamzatw n .
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·

·

·
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Sociological Institutionalism

Just as in international relations theory, economics, p olitical
science, and so many other of the social sciences, a n ew institu
tional school has appeared in sociol o gy . Hall and Taylor label
·
• 1 o giCal
.
1 1TIStltUt10na
.
•
•
1 lSffi.
"91 Th e SC h_00 1 0 f. SOClO.
t h.!S SCrh 0011 -', SOClO
logical institutionalism first appeared within the subspecialty of
.
.
.
L • sc h�oo 1
1 e t mpetus tor
t h e creati o n o�f tms
r
. n theory.
'
92 Th
orgamzatw
was discomfort w ith a distinction-drawn since the time of }Jax
Weber-between rational, formal, modern organizations (such as
bureaucracy) and the parts of social life associated with c� lture. 93
Some soci ologists found this distinction to be artificial , and ar
gued against the notion that a certain class of i nstitutions are cho
sen or created simply because they are t he m ost effective at ac
complishing a desired end. Rather, they argtted, institutions are
chosen , created and transmitted in the same manner as any other
cultural artifact, such as ritual or myth. 94 Thus, the underlying
91 Sociologists themselves seem to refer to this school of thought simpl
y as
"institutionalism." See, e.g. , Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. P owell, lntrodu c·
tion, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 1 , 1
(Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eels . , 199 1). This is similar to legal
scholars who refer to their theory simply as institutionalism.
9 2 This resulted in important works such as TH E NEW INSTITUTIONALISM
IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 9 1 , and J OHN \Y/ . .MEYER & W.

RICHARD SCOTT,
ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS: RI11JAL AND
RATIONALITY (1983) ; INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONS
(W. Richard Scott & John W. Meyer eds., 1994) .
.
.
.
. .
.
1
,
P.
93 Th'ts d'tstmcttOn 1s arawn and emp1h as1ze d m
.:.-.. . D o 1o Lu m , cu!tura l
.
F rank
•

iv!odels of Organization: The Social Construction of Rational Organ izing Princi
ples, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF CULTURE 1 1 7 (Diana Crane ed, , 1994) .

t

94 See John W. Me er & Brian Rowan, institutionalized o�gan iu.tions:
Formal Structure as Mytn and Ceremony, 83 Ar·<'L .J . Soc. 34·0 (1 977) ; see also
MEYER &: SCOTT, sufFa note 92. Niel Fligstein particularl y argues that markers
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question for sociological institutionalists asks not what utilities
.
1
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' b ut mstea
.
d w h at cu 1 tural' rac(
causea an 1 n st1tut 1 0 n to be createa.
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95
d
' l '�1 ·
d
ln ee , N e1 .l' �lgstem an d R o 1oe rt �
t reet o rs 1 ec.1 to 1ts creatiOn.
land argue t hat theories that take into account political, institu
tional and cultural factors as causal �lements explain empi rical
9
data better than do economic t heories . 0
Sociological institutionalists may have the broadest definition
of institutions of any of the social sciences. Institutions , co a so
ciologi cal institutional ist, include not only fo rmal and i nformal
rules and procedures, but also symbols, cognitions, norms, and
any other ,templates that o rganize or give meaning to the human
condition. 77 This definition expl icitly blurs the distinction be
tween culture and institutions; in fact , under such a definition,
culture itself may be an institution. 9 8 The definition .is broad,
however, only in terms of what types of structures it will include;
it is quite rigorous in terms of what qualities are required of these
structures . A rul e or pattern is only considered an i nstitution by
sociological institutionalists if there is an unspoken sense that the
rul e o r pattern must be fol l owed or adhered to. 99 In this sense,
.

.

.

-

-- -

and culture are inseparable. See Niel Fligstein, Markets as Politics: A Political,
Cultural Approach to Market Institutions, 6 1 AM. Soc. REV. 656 (1996) .
95 See Hall & Taylor, supra note 6 1 , at 947. Thus, John Campbell differen
tiates sociological institutionalism from other approaches by focusing explicitly
on "the complex social interactions and institutional and historical contexts
that link state and society in ways that shape fiscal policy and their effects . "
Campbell, supra note 80, at 1 64; see also Paul J . DiMaggio & Helmut K . Anheir,
The Sociology of Nonp rofit Organizations and Sectors, 1 6 ANN. REV. Soc. 1 37
(1990) (statmg that the emergence of nonprofit organizations is caused by insti
tutional factors as well as the individual utility functions emphasized by
economists, and that to understand nonprofit organizations one must use an
industry level ecological perspective) .
96 See Neil Fligstein & Ro bert Freeland, Theoretical and Comparative Per
spectives on Corporate Organization, 2 1 ANN. REV. Soc. 2 1 , 40 (1995) .
97 See W . Richard Scott, Institutions and Organization: Toward a Theoretical
Synthesis, in lNSTinJTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS AND 0RGANIZATIONS, supra
note 92, at 55, 56.
98 See Ronald L. J epperson, Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Institution
alism, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN 0RGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS, supra
note 9 1 , at 86, 1 43, 1 50-5 1 ; John Meyer et al. , Ontology and Rationalization in
the Western Cultural A ccount, in INSTITIJTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS AND THE
ORGANIZATION, supra note 92 at 9; Lynne Zucker, The Role ofInstitutionaliza
tion in Cultural Persistence, in THE NEW INSTlnJTIONALISM IN 0RGAN
IZATIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 9 1 , at 83.
9 9 See Jepperson, supra note 98, at 143 , 145 (notin g that "institutions repre
sent � � ocial order or p atte �n that has attained a certam state or property" and
p rovdmg an explanatiOn ot that state or property) ; Lynne G. Zucker, Orgam-
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Paul D iMaggio and \X/ alter Powell argue that the definition used
by sociological institutionalists is actually more restrictive than
that used by institutional economists, who consider mere rules of
.
.
.
.
100
convemence to b e mst1tutwns.
Sociological instituti onalism is no more unified than historical
institutionalism. 1 0 1 Nonetheless, b road themes can be discerned.
Sociological instituti onalism emphat ically embraces a cultural ap
proach to the relationship between i nstitutions and individual be
havior. 1 02 Sociological i�stitutionalism "emphasize[s] the way in
which i nstitutions influence behavio r by p roviding the cognitive
scripts, categories and models that are indispensable for action,
not least because without them the world and the behaviour of
others cannot be interpreted. " 1 03 Institutions and indi vidual be-

zations as Institutions, in RESEARCH IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS
1 , 2 (S . B . Bacharach ed. , 1983) (stating that " institutionalism is fundamentally a

cogmtive p rocess") . Public international lawyers will note the similarity to cus
tom, which is considered a source of international law that is b inding, in part,
because there is a sense that it is binding. See Statute of the International Court
of Justice, June 26, 1945, art . 3 8 , 59 Stat. 1055, 1 060, 3 Bevans 1 1 53, 1 1 87
(stating that to constitute custom, a country's behavior must n o t o nly consist o f
a general practice but must also be accepted by that country as obligatory) ; see
also IAN BRO\'ifNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-5 (4th ed.
1990) (discussing custom) .
100

See D iMaggio & Powell, supra note 9 1 , at 9; see also MARY DOUGLAS,
How INSTITUTIONS THINK 46-48 (1986) . Whether one definition actually is
more restrictive than another is not a question with an obj ective answer, and
has much to do with the underlying perspective of each school of thought . The
instrumentalist orientation of institutional economics requires a definition that
includes rules of convenience, whereas the cultural orientation of sociological
institutionalists requires a definition that includes constructs that often are not
scrutinized by other schools.
101

DL.Maggio and Powell begin their introduction to sociological institu
tionalism by noting that "it is often easier to gain agreement about what it is
not than about what it is." DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 9 1 , at 1 .
102

See supra

proach) .

notes

80-83

and accompanying text (discussing the cultural ap

103

Hall & Taylor, supra note 6 1 , at 948; see also DiMaggio & Powell , supra
note 9 1 , at 3 ("[T]hougl:it of self, social action, the state, and citizenship are
shaped by institutional forces.
Hall and Taylor note that "[i]nstitutions in
fluence behaviour not simply oy specifying what one should do but also by
specifying what one can imagine oneself doing in a specific context . " Hall &
Taylor, supra note 61, at 948; see also Neil Fligstein, Social Skill and Institutional
Theory, 40 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 397, 397 (1997) (noting that sociologi
cal institutionalism "treats shared meanings as constraints o n action that limit
and determine what is meaningful behavior") ; Zucker, supra note 98, at
(noting that shared cognitions define "what has meaning and what actions are
possible") .

nl.
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havior, therefore, are mutually constitutive and mutually rem
forcing. 1 04 rv1oreover, even though an individual may be acting
rationally or out of self interest, perceptions of rationality or s�lf
1 =>
interest are framed through-and thus shaped by-institutions. 0
Sociological institutionalism also propounds a cultural account
for the ori gination and alteration of institutions . This is most eas
ily understood when contrasted with institutional economics. In
stitutional economics places the creation or alteration of i nstitu
tions in the hands of entrepreneurs who act when the benefits of
6
creation or alteration will outweigh the costs. 1 0 In other words,
institutional economics proffers a voluntaristic, means-end ori
ented explanation. Sociological institutionalism, on the othe r
hand, does n o t p roffer a utilitarian explanation; instead, i t argues
that institutions are created or changed because the new institu
tion will confer greater social legitimacy on the organization or its
individuals . "In other words, o rganizations emb race specific insti
tutional forms or p ractices because the latter are widely valued
1
within a broader cultural environment. " 0 7 Legitimate institu
tions should not be confused with laudable institutions, the adjec
1 8
tive that is more accurate is "plausible" 0 -institutions are ac.
are cons1' d ere d " app ropnate. " 1 0 9 0nee create d or
cepte d 1'f tney
1
104

See supra note 83 (discussin g the mutually reinforcing roles of actions
and institutions and similarities with law) ; see also Jep p erson, supra note 98, at
146 �"institutions simultaneously empower and control") .
1
5 See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 9 1 , at 1 0 ("[T]he very notion of ra
tional choice reflects modern secular rituals and myths that constitute and con
strain legitimate actions.") ; see also Ann Swidler & J or?e Arditi, The New Sociol
ogy of Knowledge, 20 A NN . REV. Soc. 305 (1994) ,arguing that patterns of
knowledge in organizations shape both the content and structure of knowl
edge) . Interestingly, the prominent regime theorist Robert Keohane agrees:
"institutions do not merely reflect the preferences and power of the units con
stituting them; the institutions themselves shape those preferences and that
power. " Robert 0. K. eohane , Interna tional Institutions: Two Research Programs,
32 INT'L STUD . Q. 379, 3 82 (1988) .
106
See North, supra note 8, at 19 1-92.
107
Hall & Taylor, supra note 6 1 , at 949.
108
See ROBERT WUTHNOW ET AL., CULTURAL ANALYSIS 49-50 (1984)
(stating that legitimation means "explaining or justifying the social order in
such a way as to make institutional arrangements subjectively plausible") ; see
also W. Richard Scott, Unpacking Institutional A rguments, in THE NEW
INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 9 1 , at 1 64,
1 69-70 (discussing legitimacy) .
109
See March & Ol s en , supra note 82, at 7 4 1 (stating that "actors connote
certain actions with certain situations by rules of appropnateness") . In Limits of
Citizenship, Yasemin Soysal concludes that states adopted certam policies to-
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altered, institutions persist not because they are useful but instead
because institutions constrain the manner in which individuals are
.
.
.
1 10
aD
1 1 e to c o ns 1' der c h_angmg mstltutwns.
Sociological institutionalism has not been com p letely voiceless
in mainstream legal scholarship· . Edward Rubin, who advocates a
fy ·
1 1 ·
· rror 1 aw, 1 mcorpone·�v mst1tut10nansm as a um mg t heoretlc
rates the work of James March and Johan Olsen as well as those
of Paul DiJVIaggio and Walter Powell in his explanation of institu
tionalism . 1 1 2 Rubin's is a very limited use of sociological institu
3
tionalism-he suggests a microanalysis of courts as institutions. 1 1
Nonetheless, his approach-in which he examines societal motiva
tions of judges in an institutional context-resonates with the gen
1 4
eral tenets of sociological institutionalism. 1 Rubin ' s use of so
ciological institutionalism stands virtually alo ne in legal
scholarship, and has not been replicated in international legal
scholarship.
In short, although sociological institutionalism is an emerging
school of thought, its concept of h ow institutions inform individ
ual behavior and how institutions are created and altered can be
.

"

•

·

•

1

•

,

wards immigrants not because those policies were functional or beneficial to
the state but instead because those policies conformed to evolving concepts of
human rights. Y ASEMIN NUHOGLU SOYSAL, LIMITS OF CITIZENSHIP 1 64
(1 994) . The concep� of . appropriateness may be vaguely reflect�d in Richard
Posner , s concept or mtUitwn. For example, Posner has defended slavery con
tracts as a matter of economic theory and of legal theory. See RICHARD A .
POSNER, THE ECONOMICS O F J USTICE 86 (1981) (economic theory) ; Richard
A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theo ry , 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 0 3 ,
134 (1979) 0egal theory) . He does not countenance slavery contracts, however,
because they fail "the ultimate test" of a moral theory, which he describes as
conformity to intuition. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF J U
RISPRUDENCE 376-77 (1 990) . Similarly, even if some utility argument in favo r
o f slavery could be fabricated, sociological institutionalism predicts that slavery
would not be instituted because it is not considered appropriate and certainly
does not enhance the legitimacy on an organization.
1 10
See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 9 1 , at 10- 1 1 , 1 4- 1 5 . With an inter
esting turn of a phrase, DiMaggio and Powell state "[i]n other words, some of
t h e most important sunk costs are cognitive." Id. a t 1 1 .
111
See Rubin, supra note 1 .
1 12
See Edward L. Rubin, Legal Reasoning, Legal Process and the Judiciary as
an Institution, 85 CAL. L . REV . 265, 280 n.41 (1997) (reviewing C"-.SS R.
StJNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING A N D POLITICAL CONFLICT (1996)). Rubin also
refers to institutional economists such as Douglass North and Oliver William
son. See id.
1 13

See id. at 281.

l H A particularly excellent example is Edward Rubin
Creating Legal Doctrine, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 989 (1996) .

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol19/iss2/10

& Malcom Feeley,

FOR GOTTEN LINKA GES

1998]
•

l

1

487

�

h 1 ess , even Lwug
�
'h tnese
1
.,
. 1 prn1Cl. .
analyt1ca
sketchea out . t·� o :n eL1e
ples are available, they have barely entered the realm of legal
.
1 '
.
'
.
1 1.tega1
ana., . have not 'been nnpo
mternatwna
rte d mto
sc1h o 1-t arsmp
In particular, sociological institutionalism has not
been used a s a model for analysis of the 'World Trade Organiza

scholarship.1i5

tion.

2. 1.3.

.Historical institutionalism and Sociological
Institutionalism Differ

Historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism
differ from one another. At the level of first principles, which is
the level at vlhich this Article scrutinizes the various theoretical
schools, they differ on at least two points: the creation and altera
tion of institutions, and t he role of i nstitutions in affecting indi
vidual behavior.
With respect to the creatio n and alteration of i nstitutions, the
difference might be summarized as one of perspective; histori cal
i nstitutionalism looks inward while sociological institutionalism
looks outward. In other words, historical institutionalism exam
ines factors pertinent to t he i nstitution under scrutiny-its p ast
and the decisio n constraints that flow fro m the past-when asking
how an institution came i nto existence. Sociological institutional
ists, o n the other hand, examine facto rs that are exogenous to the
institution under scrutiny--institutions al ready existing i n the
cultural milieu act as the constraints on the creation and alteration
of institutions.
With respect t o the role of i nstitutions in affecting i ndividual
behavior, the difference i s one o f scope. Both historical and s ocio
l ogical institutionalism accept the cultural approach t o this rela
tionship . Historical i nstitutionalism, howeve r, also accepts the
115

It should be noted t hat the Yale School of international law did b orrow
conceots from the sociology of the time. The Yale School port rayed interna
'
tional law as process, and emphasized the interrelatedness of legal and other so
cial processes . Unlike current sociological theory , however, the Yale School
displayed a distinctly realist posture . F o r example, the test of international de
ciswns was whether t hey conformed with cenam values critical to a world or
der among nations. Similarly, the Yale School posits that enforcement of deci
sions is sha?.?d by social , moral and pol itical relations among nations. See
MYRES S . MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P . FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM
WOP.LD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
COERCION ( 1 9 6 1 ) ; Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman , The Prescribing
Order: How !ntema tionaf Law is !Hade, 6 YALE ] . WORLD PUB . ORDER 249

(1980) .

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

' t 'l Econ.
U. j.)a. J. m

488

,.

..

L

[Vol 19:2

calculus app roach, thus evidencing a wider or perhaps more eclec
tic p erspective on the relationship between institutions and indi
vidual behavior. An equally meaningfLd difference with respect
to the role of i nstitutions in affectin g i ndividual behavior is i n the
quality of the treatment of the relationship between individual
behavio r and institutions. Taylor and Hall chide h istorical insti
6
tutionalism for its lack of detailed attenti on t o the rel ati onship . 1 1
A great amount of sociologi cal institutionalism , in contrast, fo
cuses on the relationshi p b etween institutions and individual be
havior, particularly on the cognitive role of i nstitutions; this at
tention shapes a version of the cultur?.l approach that is both
detailed and unique to sociological institutionalism .
2. 2.

A lternative Institutionalisms can be Distingu ished from
Other Institutionalisms

Just as differences can be found b etween historical i nstituti o n
alism and sociological institutionalism, critical diffe re nces can b e
discerned between t h e " alternative" institutionalisms a n d t h e two
types of institutionalism that have e ntered the m ai nstream of in
ternationai law scholarship. A gain o n the level of first principles,
diffe rences exist in the explanation each theoretical schoo l offers
for the creation and alteration of i nstitutions, and for the role of
institutions in affecting individual behavior.
Perhaps the greatest contrast is with respect to the creation o r
alteration o f institutions . Regime t heory and i nstitutional eco
nomics offer little theoretical substance on this subject . 1 1 7 Indi
viduals or states choose an i nstitution from a wide menu of possi
bilities based on how well (or efficiently) that i nstitution will
effectuate the individuals' or states' p refe rences . Neither regime
theory nor institutional economics explain how the menu is cre
ated, and the only constraint placed on the behavior of self
interested actors is info rmational. I n contrast , historical i nstitu
tionalism and sociological institutionalism, as discussed above, of-

116

See Hall & Taylor, sutJra note 6 1 , at 950. Their criticism is all the more
credible given that Peter Hal l is a leading h istorical institutionalist.
1 17
Robert Keohane admits that regime theory, the school of which he is a
prominent member, "leave[s] open the issue of what kinds of institutions will
develop, to whose benefit, and how effective they will be." Keohane, supra
note 105, at 3 8 8 .

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol19/iss2/10

.1r,DR GO TTEJV LJNKA GES

1998]

489

fer elabo rate exulanations of how that menu is created, and sug.
' 1
}
i 18
gest a great n u mlb er O [f constramts on actors o e 1av1 0 r .
Regi m e theory and institutional economics do have elaborate
explanations fo r the role institutions pl ay in ordering b ehavior,
although in the case of regime theory the analysis often deals with
the behavior of states rather than individuals or voluntarv associa.
119
.
twns .
Instltutwns are use d as too 1 s to accomp,rl s h en d s,
, and. are
used in a voluntary and rational manner. Institutional economics
in particular offers the m ost detailed explanation of individual be
havior, although it is an explanation that rests uncomfo rtably on
.
.
PO
1
stark assumptwns ab out state an d m d 1v1
' ' d ua 1 oe h avwr . - I n contrast, historical institutionalism and sociological instituti onalism
offer a far less detailed explanation for individual behavio r . In the
case of historical institutionalism, the lack of detail may be attrib
utable to a p reoccupation with other aspects of institutionalism;
nonetheless, historical institutionalism offers the insight that the
cal culus approach and the cultural approach may both be plausi
ble in different times and situations. In the case of sociological in
stitutionalism, the lack of detail is p ro bably attributable to the
enormous task that the t heory takes on, which is t o fit behavior
into the context of entire cult� res.
Each of the four iterations of institutionalism discussed in this
Article have analytical strengths and weaknesses, and each has as
pects that the others could profitably borrow . The insights of re
gime theory and instituti onal economics, as well as instances of
their application to the World Trade Organization, are discussed
above. What is equally interesting is that historical institutional.

.

.

118

In a similar vein, DiMaggio and Powell suggest that a dividing line
among the various forms of institutionalism is whether a particular form of in
stitutionalism's definition of institutions reflects the preferences of individuals
or collective outcomes that are not the simple sum oi individual interests. See
DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 9 1 , at 9. In this context it is interesting to con
trast the common economic meaning of entrepreneur-to whom North attrib
utes the changing of institutions, with the definition proffered by Fligstein-an
actor with well developed social skills, particularly the ability w motivate co
operation among other actors. See Fligstein, supra note 103 passim.
1 19
But see supra note 36 (noting that a small number of regime theorists ar
gue for the application of regime theory to non-state actors) .
120
See Donohue & Ayres, supra note 40, at 8 1 2 (noting the limitations
caused by the "clean assumr.tions" of law and economics) ; Thelen & Steinmo,
supra note 62 , at 12 (descnbing the "ruthless elegance" of economic explana
tions) .
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and sociological insrituti onalism also offer insights into the
World Trade Organization .

1sm

2. 3.

Historical Institutionalism and Sociological
Institutionalism aYe lnstructi7Je to the Legal A nalvsis
oF
the
J
World Trade Organ ization

These differences between regime theory and i nstitutional
economics on the one hand) and historical institutionalism and
sociological institutionalism on the other, suggest that the alterna
tive institutionalisms offer new perspectives t o the legal scholar,
and as a corollary offer trade scholars a means of sharpening their
analysis of the Worid Trade Organization. Three s h o rt examples
121
indicate that this is in fact the case .
The first example i s t h e dispute settlement p rocess o f the
World Trade Organization. Several scholars h ave intuited that
the dispute settlement process cannot be understood ·�;vithout un
derstanding the process under the GATT. Their intuition is evi
denced by the fact t hat prior to discussing dispute settlement
within the World Trade Organization, these scholars often p ro
i22
vide lengthy discussions of the p rocess under the GATT_
As a
purely technical matter, such discussion is not required because
the \'// orld Trade O rganization is distinct from and is not the
.
.
.
I G· A�T
tee h mea 1 successor to tne
l . PJ
- T_nsntutwna
1 econom1es d oes
not require such a discussion, because institutions are created by
rational actors free from the burden of prior institutions. Simi
larly, regime theory has no place for such a discussion. In the ab.

121

These examples, of course, are not exhaustive. The question asked by
this Article is not how alternative institutionalisms may be applied to analysis
of the World Trade Organization , but instead why these iterat ions of institu
tionalism have not to date been used in such analysis.
122

p

See, e.g. , Ari� Reich, From ip!omacy :o L�w: The juridicization of !nter
natwnal Trade Relatzons, 17 J. INT L L. & Bus. 77":> (1 996-97) .
123

See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art . 2, cL 4,
I.LM. :l 1 44, 1 1 45 (1 994) [heremafter the "Charter"] ("The General Agree
ment on Tariffs and Trade 1994 as specified in Annex 1 A (hereinafter referred
to as ' GATT 1994') is legally distinct from the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, dated 30 October 1 947 . . . as subsequently rectified, amended o r
modified (hereinafter referred t o as ' GATT 1 947') n) ; Amelia Porges , Introduc
.
tory Note to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Muitllateral Trade
Negotiations (The Uruguay Round) : Final Act Embody ing the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, 33 I.L.1vi. 1, 4 \1 994) (quoting then Di
rector-General Peter Sutherland as emphasizing t hat the Worid Trade Organi
zation "will not be a successor agreement to GATT, as defined in the Vienna
Convention") .

33
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of a theo retical framework, the i ntuitions of scholars ana
lyzing dispute settlement become nothing more than interesting
.
1
k
l . [
oac grounG mrormatwn.
Historical instituti onalism provides a theoretical perspective
in which understanding dispute settlement under the GATT is of
critical importance to u nderstanding dispute settlement within
the '.Y/ o rld Trade O rganization. Dispute settlement under the
GATT constituted the antecedent conditions from which dispute
settlement within the W o rld Trade Organization arose . John
Croome' s insightful hist o ry of the Uruguay Round of multilateral
trade negotiations reveals several points during the seven years of
124
negotiation that might be considered critical junctures;
alterna
tively, the entire negotiations could be considered a cleavage i n
125
t h e governance of international trade .
In either case, historical
institutionalism posits that the antecedent conditions i mpose con
strai nts on the choices that are available now--constraints that
must be understood in order to t ruly effect analysis of the dispute
126
E xamples of aspects of dispute settlement
settlement process.
under the World Trade O rganization that are best understood i n
historical context include t h e allowance of multiple complainants
1 27
which is an extension of several proceedings
in one proceeding,
in the 1 9 80s and a 1 9 8 9 decision by the parties to the General
sence

124

See J OHN CROOM£, RESHAPING THE WORLD TR.'\DING SYSTEM: A
H1STORY OF THE URUGUAY ROUND ( 1995) . The four years of p reparation for

and seven years of negotiation of the Uruguay Round cannot be summarized in
one footnote-even a law review footnote. Croome, who particpated in the
entire span of the Uruguay Round, recalls "the days and nights ot effo rts, the
clashes of policies and personalities, the national p ressures on negotiators, the
repeated solemn declarations of heads of st�te and government, the frust rations
and breakthroughs." !d. at 4. Examples of critical junctures might include the
1985 clz.sh between developed and developing countries over the need for a new
round of negotiations (which fundamentally changed perceptions of the Multi
fibre Arrangement) , id. at 24-25; t he circulation by Arthur Dunkel o f his Draft
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Negotiations in
199 1 (which j elled negotiators' opinions and became the new p o int of reference
for nerrotiators) , id. at 29 1 -94; and the collapse of the Blair House accords on
a ricu ure (which very nearly resulted in the failure of the Uruguay Round) ,
iu. at 3 4 1 .

�

h

125

See
cleavage) .
126

COLLIER & COLLIER, supra

See Thelen & Steinmo,
straints must be understood) .

supra

127

note

note

69,

62,

at

at

3

29-30

& n . 1 4 (discussing such

(arguing that historical con

See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes art. 9, Charter, supra note 123, Annex 2 [hereinafter Understand
ing].
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. 1 29
.
1
.
1
1 • r d part1es,
ru es govermng t n e part1c1patwn 0 £1 c m
which expand, in interesting ways , the rights given to thir� par. .
.
.
.
!JO
' /1.
tles 1il two D eCiswns b y parties to the
.
G eneral Hgreement;
an d.
131
even the much condemned secrecy of dispute settlement panels,
which was the emphatic practice o f panels convened by the
GATT . 1 3 2 The trade scholars' intuitions are c orrect, and are
given a theoretical niche i n historical i nstitutionalism.
Histo rical institutional ism gives voice to questi ons that are
outside the theoretical constructs of regime theory or i nstitutional
economics . For example, regime theory and i nstitutional eco
nomics posit a world of autonomous, roughly equal actors . In the
World Trade Organization, however, there are m arked gradations
of power. The " quad countries, " consisting of Can ada, the E uro
pean Union, Japan and the United States, are the m ost powerful
.
.
.
.
an d d eve 1 opmg
countnes, on
mem b ers . 1 33 E mergmg economies
A greement;

128

128

•

•

.

See United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Sub
stances, GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 1 36, 136-37 (1987) ; United States
Customs Users Fees, GATT B .I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 245, 245-46 (1988) ; Con
ciliation on Improvements to the GATT D ispute Settlement Rules and Proce
dures, Apr. 12, 1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 61, 64 (1989) [hereinafter
1 989 Decision].
] -?9
See Un derstan d'mg, supra note 1 27, art. 10.
1 30
See Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Set
tlement and Surveillance, Nov. 28, 1 979, GATT B.I.S.D . (26th Supp .) at 2 1 0,
2 1 3 (1979) ; 1989 Decision, supra note 128, at 65. The rules of the World Trade
Organization give third part1es access to the submissions of the primary parties,
a right that they did not enjoy under the rules for dispute settlement under the
GATT.
131
See Understanding, supra note 1 27, art. 1 3 (1) & art. 1 4(1) ; see also Jeffrey
L . Dunoff, Institutional Misfits: The GA IT, the IC] & Trade-Environment Dis
putes, 1 5 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1043, 1066 (1994) (castigating closed decisionmaking
process as "inimical" to sound decisionmaking) ; Robert F. Housman,Democra
tizing_ International Trade Decision-Making, 27 CORNELL INT ' L L .J . 699, 7 1 1
(1994) ("The application ofthese ironclad rules of secrecy is perhaps most trou
bling in the area of GATT dispute resolution . ") ; John H. Jackson, World Trade
Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict?, 49 WASH . & LEE L .
REV. 1 227, 1 2 5 5 (1992) ("For purposes o f gaining a broader constituency among
the various policy interested communities in the world . . . the GATT could go
much further in providing 'transparency' of its processes.") .
J 3?
- See, e.g. , Panel on Japanese Measures on Imp orts of Leather, May 1 5- 1 6,
1984, GATT B.I.S.D. (3 1st Supp.) at 94, 95 (1984/ (recording a decision made by
a GATT panel) . For a more ful( discussion of tnese and many other aspects of
the dispute settlement process under the World Trade Organization that stem
from practices that evolved under the General Agreement, see Philip M.
Nichols, GA TT Doctrine, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 379, 399-4 1 8 (1996) .
133 See Uruguay Round: Quad Countries Deliver Ratification of Uruguay
R ound World Trade A greement, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) ( Jan. 3, 1995) .
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t h e other hand, have entered into a series of shifting alliances. 1 3 4
Historical institutionalism, with its roots in the political scientific
analysis of power, is well situated to provide a theoretical frame
work for analysis of this aspect of the World Trade O rganiza.
)
non. 1 3
Similarly, sociological institutionalism allows scholars to
frame questions that do not arise under regime theory o r institu
tional economics. Of these, one of the more interesting has to do
with sociological institutionalism's observation that institutions
are a product of and are affected by the culture in which they are
embedded. 1 3 6 The World Trade Organization is a global institu
tion. 137 Sociological i nstitutionalism would suggest that it is the
product of a global culture . The existence of a global culture,
however is an issue that is greatly contended but little ex
s
plored . 1 3 The insight that culture informs institutions raises sev
eral questions with respect to the World Trade Organization,
such as whether, if there is no global culture, the World Trade
Organization or the rules that it pro mulgates can t ruly persist;
whether the rules issued by the World Trade Organization and

1 3 4 See ROBERT E. HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT
LEGAL SYSTEM ( 1987) ; Robert E . Hudec, GA IT and the Developing Countries,
1992 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 67.
1 3 5 See Hall & Taylor, supra note 61, at 954 (extolling the ability of histori
cal institutionalism to analyze power) .
.
136
See supra notes 93-96 and accompanymg text .
137 See Philip M. Nichols, Extension of Standing in World Trade Organiza·
tion Disputes to Nongovernment Parties, 17 U . PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 295, 322-23
( 1996) (distinguishing the European Union as a federation of culturally related
nations from the World Trade Organization as a global organization) . As of
October, 1997, the World Trade Organization had 132 members and 32 ob
servers from all parts of the world .
1 8
3
See, e.g. , ANTHONY D. KING, THE BUNGALOW: THE PRODUCTION OF
A GLOBAL CULTURE (2d ed. 1995) (using similarities of architectural style in
India, Britain, North America, Africa, Australia and continental Europe to ar
gue in favor of the inter-relatedness of worldwide social phenomena) ; William
Alonso, Citizenship, Nationality and Other Identities, 48 J. INT'L AFF. 585, 588592 ( 1995) (describing a study that finds some identification with a global cul
ture, but closer identtfication with local factors); Jason Clay, Global Culture is
Globaloney, UTNE READER, Jan./Feb. 1996, 36 at 37 (arguing that the putative
global culture is really a I? rofit-oriented manipulation 'by those with an interest
tn marketing the concept) ; Mel van Elteren, Conceptualizing the Impact of U.S.
Popular Culture Globally , 30 J. POPULAR CULTURE 47 ( 1996) (statmg that the
spread of U.S. culture 1s due to an increase in capitalistic consumensm rather
than a global culture, but noting that the spread has the effect of homogenizing
culture worldwide) .
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ot her international economic organizations will engender a global
culture; and how a thin global culture would constrain the func
tioning and enforcement of the ·world Trade O rganizat i o n ' s rules
and policies .
Unfortunately, sociologists have only b e gun t o
scratch t h e surface of international institutions, a n d offer little
•
1
•
1 •
• 1
139
guwance.
1
N onet h�e1ess
, t h e questwns ra1sed b y socw10g1ca mstitutionalism are of obvious interest to t rade law scholars.
•

T

3.
3. 1.

•

'

THE QUESTION OF SCHOLARLY LINKA GE

Institutional Explanations a/Historical Institutionalism 's
and Sociological institutionalism 's Lack ofInfluence on the
Analysis ofthe World Trade Organization

It is apparent t hat regime theory and economic institutional
ism do not exhaust the universe of institutionalisms . It is also ap
parent that other forms of institutionalism can p rovide a useful
prism for the scrutiny of international law in general, and for
analysis of the World Trade O rganization in particular. The ob
vious question, therefore, is why these alternat ive forms o f insti
tutionalism are not widely used. Interestingly, the alternative in
stitutionalisms themselves provide possible answers to this
question. In o rder to embark upon this analysis, it i s necessary to
accept that legal scholarship is itself an institution, replete with
form al and info rmal rules, motivated actors, and shared cogni.
1 40
uons .
The first means by which to examine the scholarly l inkages
that have already occurred is through historical i nstitutionalism.
Historical institutionalism emphasizes path dependency. Future
direction is conditioned by the past; significant change occurs at
critical junctions or points of cleavage. A gainst this background,
it is interesting to turn to a story related by the comparative l egal
schol ar Alan Watson. Watson is not a historical institutionalist,

. m. But see, e.g. , David Stra_;:. g & John W. Meyer, Institutional Conditions f
or
D iffuswn, m INSTITUTIONAL .eNVIRONMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONS, 100
Richard Scott & John W. Meyer eels . , 1994) (analyzing h o·w institutions a±fect

(w.

cultural diffusion) .
140

See Nancy L .

Cook,

Outside the Tradition: L iterature as Legal Scholarship,

63 U. CINN. L. REV. 95, 148 (1 994) (stating that the development of legal schol

arship is like that of "any inst itution"') ; see also Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems
82 CORNELL L. REV. 479, 479-8 1 (1 997) (discussing the func.
1 •
h 1p/
' ).
nons
orr 1 ega1 scnolars

Approach to Law,
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. .
1 4 1 WT
t
w at. h ow 1 aws d eve 1 op an d cnange.
b ut h e too 1s mtereste d m
son attributes one factor in the development and change in legal
systems to acc.t.d ent an d " ch ance . " 1 42 H e re 1 ates a story concermng
the development of law in South Africa. A South African physi
cian happened upon one of Watson's books, Legal Transp lants, in
a bookstore shortly before a return flight to Sout h Africa. The
physician, who assumed that the book dealt with the law of medi
cal transplants, purchased the book. Although the book actually
deals with the transplant and reception of laws, the physician en
j oyed the book and, after a series of letters with Watson, p rovided
Watson with funds to edit a translation of Justinian 's Digest. The
translation was made available in South Africa, where it resulted
in a measurable increase in the use of Roman law in South Afri
can legal decisions. 1 4 3 In relating this story, Watson revels in dis
cussing the chance or accidental nature of this line of legal devel•
•
r
opment . 1 44 W h at 1s most mterestmg
tor
t h e purposes o f t h e
present analysis, however, is Watson's observation that the intro
duction of a single text into South African jurisprudence had tre
mendous impact on the formulation of South African law. 145
Abbott's article on regime theory was not accidentally pur
chased on the way to an airport. The lesson of Watson's story,
however, is apparent. Abbott 's article shaped the direction of in
ternational legal scholarship, and conditioned its path toward ac
ceptance and use of regime theory. 1 4 6 Burley's synthesis further
constrained international law scholarship . 147 Had Abbott written
.1

·

•

141

See, e.g. , ALAN WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF LAW (1985).
Alan Watson, Aspects of Recep tion of Law, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 335, 341
(1996) . Altogether, Watson suggests four factors: utility of the transplanted
law, accident and chance, difficulties of clear sight, and the authority enhancing
effect of the transplanted law. See id. at 335-45.
143 See id. at 340.
1 44
It should be noted that neither economic institutionalism nor regime
theory �re eq�ipped t � interp �et this story. In� eed, Watson fimsel_f is r�duced
to labelmg th1s factor chance. !d. at 339. He also notes that "[p ]unsts wtll ob
ject and say that I am relying on anecdotal evidence. Yes, I am. But that in no
way impairs my argument . . . . [c]hance cannot systematically be factored into
any development." Id. at 341 . Historical institutionalism provides a theoretical
means of categorizing this critical junction in the development of South African
law.
145 See id. at 340-4 1 .
1�6
See supra note 30 (noting that scholars who used regime theory analysis
acknowledged Abbott) .
147 See supra note 2 1 (relating plaudits for Burley) .
142
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an article expounding the app lication of historical institut ionalism
to l egal theory , or had Burley explicated a detailed history of so
ciology rather t han international relations theory, it is p robable
that the landscape of international law scholarship in general and
of analysis of the incernational t rade regime i n particular would
be quite different today.
Such a story rnay seem incomplete-it begins abruptly with
the publication of Abbott ' s article. A lingering question remai ns:
from where did this article arise? While only A bbott can fully
answer that question, he does p rovide a clue i n the article itself.
That clue, in turn, can be placed within the structure o f sociologi
cal institutionalism. A b bott opines that international relations
theory, from which regime theory is taken, is the closest of the
1 8
social sciences to internat ional law scholarship. 4 In sociological
institutionalism terms, Abbott i s culturally predisposed, p erhaps
even constrained, to borrow from i nternational relations theory.
This is t ru e both cognit ively and with respect to l egitimization.
Cognitively, Abbott ' s writings indicate that he is steeped in
knowledge of institutionalism and t hat he is a profound re
searcher. As a scholar t rained in international l aw and interna
tional relations, however, he simply may not have "seen" histori-·
cal
or
sociological
i nstitutionalism.
With
respect
to
legitimization, Abbott may, consciously o r unconsciously, have
considered borrowing from a related social science t o be more ap
propriate than borrowing from political science or s ociology _ 1 49
148

Abbott, supra note 10, at 342; see also Burley, supra note 2 1 , at 205 ("Just

�s constitutional lawyers study political. th�ory, and political theorist� i�q�ire

mto the nature and substance of const1tut1ons, so too s hould two dJscplmes
that study the laws of state behavior seek to learn from one another.") .

q

149
Edward L . Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal
Scholarship, 80 CAL. L. REV . 8 8 9 , 900 (1 992) (noting that methodological com
mitment tends to bind legal scholars and diminish acceptance o f alternatives) .
Indeed, some aspects of historical institutionalism and sociological institutional
ism may seem to some le�al scholars to resonate with the deconstructionist al
l ies of the school of crit1cal legal studies, which is anat hema to many U.S.
scholars a n d t h u s would n o t be considered institutionally appropriate. I n addi
tion t o criticism of its logic, deconstructionism is criticized as co ntributing to
excessive cynicism and mhilism while contributing nothing positive to legal
theory. See, e. g. , DAVID C. HOY & THOMAS MCCARTHY, CRITICAL THEORY
(1 994) (criticiz.mg deconstructionism) ; Martha C. Nussbaum , Skepticism A bout
Practic,-zf Reason in Literature and the Law, 1 07 HARV.
7 1 4, 743
(criticizin g deconstructionism) ; Girardeau A . Spann, Deconstructing the Legisla
tive Veto, 68 �AINN. L. REV . 4T.? , 540-41 (19 84) (questioning whether decon
struction adds anyt hing to legal ;:;. nalysis) ; see also Vivian Gross·wald Curran, De
A ntisem itism and the Law, 3 6 B . C. L. REV . 1

L. REV.

construction, Stnu:trmdlsm,
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be told with res p ect to e co n o m i c institu
tionalism, although net quite as directly. The modern law 2-nd
economics m ovement probably began when Aaron Director, an
economist at the U niversitv of C hi c ago , introduced several mem.
150
..
.
'
/
bers or that umversJ.ty s lav1 faculty to econo miC t h eo ry .
From
that be g innin g , law and economics has g one through several intel
lectual generations, b,��oming more b roadly dist r ib ut e d thro ugh
dl
Thus) it is not possible to draw a straight
out legal schola rship .
line from Di re ct o r -to Trachtman, as it is from Abbott to Shell . 152
Nonetheless, a historical institutionalist might argue t h at at a
critical juncture , when l e gal scholarship was recept ive to a new
paradigm, D irector's protegees sent legal scholarship along t he
path of law and economics, and that the choices available to legal
scholarship are now constrained by that choice . 153 Under this
line of reasoning, it would be considered i nstitutio n ally likely that
a scholar would apply institutional economics to the �! orld Trade
can

(outlining criticisms of deconstructionism, from a perspective sympathetic to
deconstructionism) . The difference, of course, is that while deconstructionism
simply posits t hat wo rds have no objective meaning, histo rical institutional ism
and soc10logical institutionalism pos1t that the meaning attributable to various
cognitions may be attributable w several sets of rules, mcluding self-referential
rules.
150

(1995)

See NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 3 1 6-30

(discussing the be � inning and early h istory of law and economics) .
Among the first law faculty that D i rector worked on were Ro bert Bork and
Richard Posner. See id. An interesting history, albeit recounted very subj ec
tively by actual participants, of the nascence of the modern law and econo mics
movement is Edmund W. Kitch, The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and
Economics at Chicago, 1932- 1 970, 26 J .L. & ECON. 1 63 (1983/ (reproducing a
transcript of a discussion among a number of members of the 1 aw c>. nd econom
ics school) . Intellectually, modern law and economics may have its roots i n
Ronald H . Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1 960) , and
Guido Calabre:;i, Some Thoughts on R isk Distribution and the Law of Tom, 70
YALE L.J. 499 (1961) . See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE
LAW 19-20 (3d ed. 1986) (discussing the influence of the two articles) .
151

See POSNER, supra note 1 50, at 19-20 (outlining a history of the law and
economics school) ; Gary Minda, The Jurispmdential Mo�·ements of the 1980s, 50
OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 604- 1 3 (1989) (same) ; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Law and Eco
nomics: Paradigm, Politics or Philosophy, in LAW AND ECONOMICS 233
(Nicholas Mercuro ed., 1989) (explainin� the basic ideas of the ' Chicago' and
'Reformist ' schools of b_w and economics; .
152
1 53

Shell himself draws

that line. See supra

note

31.

Robert Ellickson reports that the percentage o f law facul ty with Ph.D . 's
in economics grew considerably from 1960 to 1 9 7 0 . See Robert C. Ellickson,

Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational A ctors: A Critique of Classical
Law and Econoraics, 65 CHI.-KHH L. REV. 23, 26-27 (1989) .
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O rganization, 1 54 and unlikely that institutionalism from another
school of thought would be applied .
.Again, this story seems incomplete-its conclusion of inevita
bility seems rather self-fulfilling . And again, sociologi cai institu
tionalism may offer a more satisfying explanatio n . Sociological
institutionalism argues that institutions will be created or changed
.
. ways t h.at are cons1. d ere d app ropnate.
1s
.
.
1 5 5 Law an d economiCs
tn
wildly controversial as a theoretic for legal scholarship, 1 56, but it
nonetheless has earned a position as a legitimate heuristic . b 7 Just
as importantly, law and economics analysis has become a p roven
route }or ensuring publication and obtaining tenure and p romo
tion. b B It is difficult to make the same claim for political science
or sociology, particularly in recent years . 1 5 9 Thus, culturally, it is
more legitimate and appropriate to borrow fro m i nstitutional
154

Recounting this line of reasoning is not meant to imply that Trachtman's analysis is neither original nor well executed. It is both, m abundance.
1 '" 5
See Scott, supra note 97, at 1 69-70.
156

See Avery Wiener Katz, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Eco
nomics, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2260 (1996) ("The tension among efficiency,
equity, and other aspects of justice remains as controversial as ever in public
discourse.") ; see also Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV.
1 , 8 (1986) (noting that law and economics is controversial because it makes
radical assumptions and because it reduces values to preferences) .
1 57 See Linz Audain, Critical Legal Studies, Fem in ism, Law and Econom ics,
and the Veil of Intellectual Tolerance: A Ten tative Case for Cross-Jurisp_rudential
Dialogue, 20 HOFSTRA L . REV. 1017, 1 045 (1992) (noting that wh1le the as
sumptions of law and economics are controversial, the methodology is not, be
cause it is simply the methodology of economics) ; see also Gregory S. Crespi,
The Mid-Life Crisis of the Law an d Economics Movement: Confron ting the Prob
lems ofNonfalsifiabz [ity and Normatzve Bzas, 67 NOTRE DAME L . REV. 23 1 , 23 132 (199 1) (discussing the influence of law and economics) .
158
See Donald N. McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Law and Econom ics, 86
MICH. L. REV. 752, 765 (1988) ("In his Maccabean lecture on jurisprudence in
1981, Guido Calebresi reported the current opinion that law and economics
was the only sure route to promotion and tenure.") ; Mark T ushnet, Cri t ical Le
gal Studies: A Political History, 1 00 YALE L .J. 1 515, 1519 n. 1 8 (1991) ("I am hard
pressed to identify a leading law faculty that has denied tenure to someone
prominently identified as a . . . law and economics person, and find it absurdly
easy to identify law faculties that have denied tenure to [critical legal studies]
peo� le. ") .
59
An exception might be the Yale School of International Law, which
professed to borrow from sociology (althou g h now a dated sociology) , and
which occasionally is itself explicitly borrowed from. See, e.g. , David J. Gerber,
International Discovery After A erospatiale: The Quest for an A nalytical Frame1.£.;ork, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 52 1 , 543 n. 125 (1988) (borrowing from the Yale
School, ::tlbeit in a domestic context) . The Yale School is discussedsupra note
1 15.
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economics than from historical institutionalism or sociologi cal in�
•
1 •
stttutwna11sm .
Regime theory and institutional economics are singularly un
helpful in explaining why they are the dominant institutionalisms
used to an a ly ze the World Trade Organization. Regime theory is
inapplicable to a questi o n of the institution of scholarship , but its
p rinciples would suggest that a number of autonomous scholars
with relatively equal power selected regime theory and institu
tional economics as the most effective means of obtaining their
preferences (which, hopefully, would be a clearer theoretical and
practical understandin g of the World Trade Organization) . Insti
tutional economics would make a similar argument, substituting
efficient for effective . These self-congratulatory arguments, how
ever, are wrong; it has already been demonstrated that historical
institutionalism and sociological institutionalism offer u nique and
6
valuable insights into the World Trade Organization . 1 ° C learly,
the explanations suggested by historical · i nstitutionalism and so
ciological i nstitutionalism are the more persuasive.

3. 2.

W1ry Other A nalytical Linkages May Not Exist

The inquiry into why historical institutionalism and socio
logical institutionalism have not been used i n the analysis of the
World Trade Organization sheds light on another area of interest
to trade scholars. 'Why have certain analytical l inkages not been
drawn? This question is of particular interest, because trade
scholars should not assume that their repertoire for analysis, sim
ply because it is bulky , is complete.
An example of a linkage that has not been drawn , for exam
ple, is that between the World Trade Organization and ethics.
What is particularly puzzling is the fact that trade scholars have
not drawn from the rapidly growing body of literature concern
6
ing business ethics, 1 1 p articularly that branch of business ethics
.
6
.
1 b usmess. 1 2
t h at concerns mternatwna
.

160

See supm notes 1 2 1- 1 39 and accompanying text.
The field of business ethics is rapidly becoming big business.
Among other developments, the last fifteen years have seen the prolif
eration of a great number of books and articles on ethical problems in
business; the emergence of several centers and institutes at least partly
devoted to the subJeCt or to related problems like the role of values in
scientific, technological or public policy work; the spread of business
ethics courses in both college and business school curricula; and eve n ,

161
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Integrated social contract theory, as explicated by Thomas
Dunfee and Thomas Donaldson, for example, has become a
1 63
widely explored analytical tool in the field of business ethics .
It
has also found expression in general management literature. In
legal literature on trade, however, there are no refe rences to this
1 64
school of thought.
Integrated social contract theory is based on, but radically ex
tends, the tradition of social contract theorists such as Locke and
1 65
Rousseau.
Integrated social contract theory adopts the appella
tion "integrated" because it unites two distinct types of social con-

i� some corporations, the development of seminars in ethics for execu
tives.
Robert Jackall, Business as Social and Moral Terrain, in PERSPECTIVES IN
BUSINESS ETHICS 77, 77 (Laura Pincus Hartman ed., 1 998) .
162

See, e.g. , BUSINESS ETHICS: J APAN AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

(Thomas W. Dunfee & Yukimasa Nagayasu eels . , 1 99 3) ; THOMAS D ON

ALDSON, THE ETHICS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS (1989) .
163
See Jeffrey Nesteruk, 1he Moral Dy namics of Law in Business, 34 AM.
Bus. L.J . 133, 133 (1996) (stating that "v1rtue ethics and social contract the

ory . . . are increasingly influencing our understanding of ethical issues in busi
ness") ; Robert Phillips, Stakeholder Theory, Social Contracts, and a Principle
of Fairness 1 (1997) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author)
("Prominent among the myriad proposed models of business ethics are stake
holder theory and social contract theory. The latter has, in fact, been suggested
as a normative grounding for the former.") . A very clear explanation of inte
grated social contract theory can be found in DAVID J FRITZCHE, BUSINESS
ETHICS: A GLOBAL AND MANAGERIAL PERSPECTIVE 43-47 (1 997) .
164
In legal literature as a whole there are virtually no references to inte
grated social contract theory. Moreover, the only two references found by the
author of this Article are brief, and do not attempt to borrow from or integrate
the theory into legal theory. In corporate law, Timothy Fort borrows Dunfee
and Donaldson's criticism of stake.fiolder theory. See Timothy L. Fort, 1he
.

Corporation as Mediating Institution: A n Efficacious Synthesis of Stakeholder The
ory and Corporate Constituency Statutes, 73 NOTRE DAME L. R EV . 173, 1 88-89
(1997) . Steve Salbu refers to the concept of moral free space, but does not p res
ent integrated social contract theory as a model . See Steven R. Salbu, True
Codes Versus Voluntary Codes of Eth ics in International Markets: Towards the
Preservation of Colloqu1_ in Emerging Global Communities, 1 5 U. P A . J . INT'L
Bus. L. 327, 348 n.73 \1994) . It should b e noted that Professor Fort teaches at
the University of Michigan's business school, and that Professo r Sal bu received
his Ph.D. partially under the supervision of Dunfee. Both facts reinforce the
path dependency of legal scholarship .
165
See Michael Keeley, Continuing the Social Contract Condition , 5 Bus.
ETHICS Q. 241 (1995) (stating that Donaldson and Dunfee's work extends the
work of the Sophists and of Locke to modern organizations) .
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tracts. 166 The first type is a hypothetical macrosocial contract
among all of the members of a given society, the contents of
which are all of the economic rules to which all of the members
would agree. 1 67 Obviously, this will not be a great number of
rules. The result is moral free space within that hypothetical
macrosocial contract. Inside that moral free space, communities
are free to enter into the second type of social contract : explicit
contracts that provide more detailed rules concerning ethical be
These microsocial contracts are
havior in economic life . 1 6 8
bounded only by hypernorms, which are "principles so funda
mental to human existence that they serve as a guide in evaluating
lower level moral norms," 1 6 9 and by a re'\uirement that individual
members have consented to the contract . 70 Because membership
in different economic communities may overlap, thus creating
overlapping systems of rules within the moral free space of the
macrosocial contract, Dunfee and Donaldson have devised a set of
priority rules to determine which set should apply in a given
.
.
situatiOn. 1 7 1
Dunfee defines communities as "all coherent groupings of
people capable of generating ethical norms . . . includ[ing] a cor
poration, a department or other subgroup within a corporation, a
social club, an industry association, a faculty senate, a church o r
synagogue, a city government, a n association o f trial lawyers and

166

See Thomas Donaldson & Thomas W. Dunfee, Toward a Unified Con
ception of Business Ethics: Integrative Social Contracts Theory, 19 ACAD. MGMT.
REV. 252, 254 ( 1994) (explaining the appellation) .
167
See Thomas Donaldson & Thomas W. Dunfee, Integrative Social Con
tracts Theory: A Communitarian Conception of Economic Ethics, 1 1 ECON. &
PHIL. 85, 93 ( 1995) (explaining the hypothetical macrosocial contract) .
16
8 See Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note 1 66, at 260-62 (discussing moral
free space); Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note 1 67 , at 93-95 (discussing microso

cial contracts that fill in the moral free space) .
6
1 9 Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note 1 66, at 265; see also Thomas W. Dun
fee, The Role of Ethics in International Business, in BUSINESS En-nes: jAPAN
AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 1 62, at 63, 69 ("Hypernorms are de
fined as norms so fundamental to human existence that they w1ll be reflected in
a convergence of religious, political, and philosophical thought. Hyp ernorms
thus represent core or fundamental values common to many cultures.") .
170 Donaldson & Dunfee, sup ra note 1 67, at 9 8 . Consent can be indicated
by, among other means, not takmg advantage of an opportunity to exit. See id.
at 99.
1 71
See Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note 1 66, at 268-71 (outlining priority
rules for determining which community's rules apply) .
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f' l
1
so on . , 1 7 ' '-'
1 e a r1y , t h e w orld 1 r a d e Ur g amzatlon consntutes a
community under this definition. Just as clearly, l e gal scholarship
on t he World Trade O rganization could benefit fro m the disci
p line that integrated social contract theory brings to consideration
of the issue of ethics i n an economic setting, and from a theory
that "allows for moral diversity among various cultures while
1 73
maintaining certain universal norms . "
And yet, it does n ot .
That l egal scholarship h as not availed itself o f this o r other
analytics from the discipline of business ethics m ay b e explained
by the insi ghts of historical institutionalism and sociological insti
tutionalism . Historically and culturally, there h as been l ittle in
tellectual exchange between legal scholarship and business schol
arship . 174
An example is illustrative.
The concept of "core
competencies" is a staple in management scie nces and other sci
175
Out of the estim ated
ences related to the study of businesses .
176
five thousand law review articles published each year,
h owever,
a search of the LEXIS electronic database reveals o n ly sixteen ref
erences to core competencies . O f these, five could i n n o way be
construed as a reference to business theory, 1 77 fou r were made b y
1

�

•

1

----

•

•

•

..

172 Dunfee, supra note 1 69, at 68. "Thus defined, communities are groups
that determine their own membership and apply their own preferred forms of
rationality." !d.
173 FRITZSCHE, supra note 163 , at 43 .
1 74 See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and
Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J . 239, 303-05 (1984) (castigating legal scholarship and
education for its lack of integration with business theory) .
175 For an early and often-cited discussion of core competencies, see C.K.
Prahalad & Gar/ Hamel, The Core Competence of the Corporation, HARV. Bus.
REV., May-June 1990, at 79.
176 Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship A mok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and
Tenure, 103 HARV. L. REv. 926, 928 (1990) .
177 See Frank S. Bloch, Framing the Clinical Experience: Lessons on Tumin
g
Points and the Dynamics of Lawyering, 64 TENN. L. REV. 9 89, 1000 (1997)
(discussing clinical experience at the University of Tennessee) ; Teresa V. Carey,
Credentia ling for Mediators-To Be or Not To Be?, 30 U.S.F. L . REV. 635, 640
(1996) (discussing the attributes necessary for a mediator) ; Rob F ri eden ,Privati
zation of Satellite Cooperatives: Smothering a Golden Goose?, 3 6 VA. J . INT'L L.
100 1 , 1 007 (1996) (d1scussing the language of the INMARSAT Convention) ;
Emmanuel P . Mastromanolis, Insights from U.S. A ntitrust Law on Exclusive and
Restricted Territorial Distribution: The Creation of a New Legal Standard for
European Union Competition Law, 1 5 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 559, 591. (1995)
(diswssing attributes of traders) ; Donald T . Weckstein, Mediator Cert{z.cation:
Why and How, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 757, 767 (1996) (discussing training ir.t the ba
sic attributes of a mediator) .
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1 78

attorneys w n o were emp 1 oye d m b usmess settmgs ,
o n e was
. '
.
.
1 79
made by a busmessperson w h o au.t h o rea1 a very s h o rt comment,
t
180
0
11 .
t b y students.
an d two were made
ut o f a 1 Sixteen, only o ne
1
actually used the concept at length. 1 8 By contrast, a search in the
same database of the term "efficiency" yields 1 7,792 refe rences; of
the term "efficient allocation , " 1 ,056 references; of " C oase Theo
rem," 707 refere nces; of "elasticity of demand," 684 references .
Even the term "David Ricardo" yields ninety references . Clearly,
m anagement theory is not part of the culture o f legal scholarship
in any meanin gful way, whereas economic theory app ears in
abundance.
The insights of historical institutionalism and sociological in
stitutionalism-that legal scholars hip's past and present culture
lead it to certain linkages and away from others-reflects neither
well nor poo rly on legal scholarship, it is simply an observable
phenomenon. Awareness of possible institutional limitations on
.

.

·

.

178

See Craig Becker, Labor Law Outside the Employment Relation, 74 TEX.
L. REV. 1 527, 1 530 n.8 (1996) (Becker was Associate General Counsel of the
Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO) ; Ward Bower, Law Firm
Economics and Professionalism, 1 00 DICK . L . REV. 5 1 5, 529 (1 996) (Ward was a
principal of a management consultant group) ; Thomas A. Piraino, Jr.,R.econcil

ing Competition and Cooperation: A New A ntitrust Standard for Joint Ventures,
35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 87 1 , 887 (1994) (Piraino was a Vice-President of
Parker·Hannifan Corporation) ; Paul R. Verkuil, R everse Yardstick Competition:
A New Deal {or the Nineties, 45 FLA . L. REV. 1 , 17 (1993) (Verkuil was President
and CEO o f the American Automobile Association) .
1 79

See Ronald Mitsch, Innovation as Part of the U.S. Corporate Culture: In
novation Working {or You, 2 1 CAN.-U.S. LJ. 1 7 1 , 174 (1995) (Mitsch was Ex
ecutive Vice Pres1dent of the 3M Company) .
1

80

See William Kummel, Note, A Market Approach to Law Firm Econom ics:
A New Model for Pricing, Billing, Compensation and Ownership in Corporate Le
gal Services, 1996 COLUM. Bus . L. REV. 379, 399 n . 65 (discussing law firms'
competitive strategies) ; Nicholas A. Widnell , Comment, The Crystal Rdl of In·
novation Market A na lysis in Merger Review: A n Appropriate Means of Predicting
the Future?, 4 GEO . 1v1ASON L REV. 369, 393 (1996) (suggesting an approach for
measuring market concentration for innovation) .
181

See Jeffery

Atik,

Complex Enterprises and Quasi-Public Goods,

1 6 U. P A .

J. INT'L Bus. L . 1 , 30 (1995) . Mark Lemley also briefly explains the term, and
Ann E. Conaway Stilson mentions it in a way that implies part of the underly
ing concept. See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics a/Imp rovement in InteLlectual
Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REv. 9 8 9 1049 n.279 (1997) ; Ann E . Conaway Stil
son, The Agile Virtual Corporation, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L . 497, 527 (1997) . The
remaining reference is made by the former Vice Chairman of the Zambia Priva
t ization Agency. See Benjamin Lubinda Ngenda, Comparatirr.Je };fodels of Pri'Va·
tization: A Commentary on the African Experience, 2 1 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 179,
1 82 (1995) . This survey of legal literature 1s, of course, subject to the limitations
of any electronic database search.
,
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scholarly linkages creates the opportunity to t ranscend t. hose barf .
.
.
.
.
. .
.
8'
n e r s m m n ovatlve ways. 1 Awareness o� the mstltutwna,1 d1' ' f..C
nculties inherent in scholarly linkage also sheds light o n p roblems
of practical linkage between societal issues and the \Xf orld Trade
O rganization.
4.

THE TRIALS O F S CHOLARLY LIN'tCAGE SHED LIGHT O N ISSUES
OF PRACTICAL LINKAGE

The importance of theory and of scholarly analysis of the
World Trade Organization cannot be gainsaid. A rguably, the
�World Trade Organization owes its very existence to scholarly
.
.
.
.
1 trad e regime. 1 8 3 N o net h e 1 ess, 1t
ana 1 ys1s 01J t !Ll. e mternatwna
. 1s
.
important to consider the implications of the preceding section,
discussing scholarly linkages, on practical linkages that are asked
of the \vorld Trade Organization in the real ·world. Those link
ages are considerable, and growing. The World Trade O rganiza
tion is not yet five years old, but it has already been suggested as
the app ro p ri ate forum for the promulgation of rules concerning
labor) investment, transnational bribery) human rights, antitrust,
the environment, gender and racial discrimination, taxation, and
the development of democracy. 1 8 4 While it is clear that not all of
132

See Rubin, supra note 1 49, at 901 (discussing the benefits that accrue
from shifts in mainstream scholarship)
183
At the outset of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations,
of course, the creation of an international organization was not contemplated.
While, however, the Uruguay Round was proceedin � , the Royal Institute of
International Affairs commissioned Professor John JacKson to conduct a study
of the international trade regime. Jackson suggested that only the creation of
an international organization woul d bring coherency to the management of in
ternational trade regulation. His study was embraced by the European Com
munity, which formally proposed the creation of such <J.n organization. See
Gardner Patterson & E liza Patterson, The R oad frorn CA TT to MTO, 3 MINN .
J . GLOBAL TRA DE 3 5 , 41-42 ( 1994) ; see afso JOHN H . JACKSON, RE
STRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 91-103 (1990) (Chap t e r 8 entitled
"Reforming the GATT System") . It is interesting to n ote that at the time he
wrote his study, Jackson considered the creation of an actual i nt e rnatio n al or
gan izat io n "improbable" and suggested that analyzil!g it as a hyp othetical
"mi� �t. u n h er stimulate t h,ought� about s o me of the difficult institutional prob
lem., vf. . he GATT system. !d. a c 93 .
houghts, 1 0 AM . U. J . INT'L L.
134 See, e.g. , William D i e b old , Some Second T
&� Po�.'Y 1251, 1�57 (1�95) (suggesting that t�e World Trade O_E�anization issue
,
_
rules tor mternat10nal mvestment) ; Claus D1eter-Ehlermann, J ne !n ternatwnal
�!imens�on o[ Competition Policy, }7 FC?RD!-IAM INT•L LJ . 8 3 3 , 840 ( 1 994)
.
(suggest!ng t£.\ at the \Ve
rla, Trade Urgamzatwn promulgate rules on competi
tion policy) ; John H. Jackson,Reflections on InternationaL Economic La·w, 17 U.
.

�

.
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1 85
.
i. 8 6
t
. 1s
. kag;es are C1es1rao
1
these l m
1t
equa1 1 y c_ear
tr1at sorr1e are .
•j • 1 1 e,
The alternative in.stitutionalisms may shed light on t wo qu_.:.:: s tions
concern ing practical linkages: how to discern which linkages are
desirable, and how to effectuate those desirable linkages.
The author of this A rticle h as pubiished an article o n deter
minin g what issues are proper subj ects for consideration by the
'1 7
•
•
1 .. rade
. 8 Th at art1cle suggests tour cntena
• o rgamzatwn
Wor1 a1 �...
that must be satisfied for an issue to fall within the W odd Trade
Organization's mandate : that the issue be within the legal compe
tency of the ':xr o rld Trade O rganization, that the issue signifi
cantly involve trade, that the W orld Trade Organization be cap a··
ble of enforcing any guidelines related to the issue, and that the
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1
l
.
1ssue reqmre mternatwnal coord 1nat10n. 88 Tnese cntena are explicitly drawn from the nature of the World Trade Organizalion
as an international institution and from the purposes of its crea
1 9
tors. 8 In that sense, these criteri a reflect the rational and utilitar<

•

•

r

•

•

PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 17, 23-24 (1996) (suggesting that the World Trade Or
ganization will be called upo n to issue rules concernina the enviro nmen t , anti
trust and competition, lab o r standards , human rights, distributio nal issues, gen
der and other discrimination, and democratic structure) ; Philip M. Nichols,
Outlawing Transnational Bribery Through the World Trade Organizatwn, 28 L
& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 305 (1996) ; Asif H. Qureshi, Trade Related A specrs of Inter·
national Taxation-A New \.VTO Code of Conduct?, J . WORLD TRADE, Ap r.
1 996, at 161 (suggesting the World T rade Organization as a forum for the
p romulgation of uniform trade-related tax regulations) ; Thoma,s J . Schoen
baum, The lntematzon"1.l Trade Laws and the New Protectzon zsm: Toe Need for a
Synthesis with A ntitrust, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG . 393, 394 (1 994)
(sugges�ing that th� Wo�ld T rade O rganization take up the issue of �ntitrust
_
regulat10n) ; James 1' . Sm1th, NAFTA
and Human R zghts: A Necessary L m ica.f.e, 27
U.C. DAV1S L. REV. 793, 836 (1994) ("Over t ime it may be possible to explicitly
l ink membership in the WTO t o adherence to [human rights conditio ns] . ") .
185

See Philip M . Nichols, Corruption in the World Trade Organ iza tion: Dis
cern ing the Limits of the World Trade Organization 's Authority, 2 3 N . Y . U . J .
INT'L L. & POL. 7 1 1 , 7 1 4- 1 8 (1996) (arguing that excessive linkage would dilute

the clarity of the World Trade O rganization's mandate, undermine its credibil
ity, and place issues in its hands that would best be considered elsewhere) .
186

The author of this Art icle has argued, for example, that the World
Trade Organization should deal with the issue of transnational bribery. See
Nichols, supra note 1 84.
187

188

See .N ichols,

mpra note 1 8 5 .
See id. at 722-40.
See z'd. at 7 1 9 ( �peC!. f.lCa 11 y,

. requtres
.
iS9
. .
.
t h e quest10n
an und.erstandmg
o rr
what type of international organization the World Trade Organization is, and
what it ts intended by its creators and members to accomplish . ") . The analysis
relies on the taxonomy of internat ional o rganizations created by Paul Taylor in
its effort to define and characterize the World Trade Organizat i o n . See Paul
Taylor, A Conceptual Typology of lntemational Organization, in FR.AI·IiEWORKS
" "
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ian orientation of regime theory (as well as institutional econom
ics) 1 90 although that iteration of institutionalism is not explicitly
referred to in the article) . In other words, these criteria examine
intrinsic characteristics of the \\' o r l d Trade Organization as a re
gime and apply them outward. They do not reflect the historical
or cultural orientation of historical institutionalism o r sociologi
cal institutionalism. They do not examine constraints i mposed
upon the \Vorld Trade Organization through p ast decisions at
critical junctures. They do not examine the culture in which the
World Trade Organization is embedded to determine if linkage
with some issues would be more appropriate t han linkage with
other issues . These types of analysis are not typical to m ainstream
trade scholarship, but nonetheless would provide interesting in
sights into the question of the scope of the World Trade Organi
zation's authority.
An example of a practical linkage that might be excluded un
der regime theory is a linkage between trade and human rights. 1 9 1
Trade and human rights have not been linked i n the status quo . 1 9 2
Particularly given regime theories ' assumptions that actors in the
international arena are autonomous and equal, regime theory
might lead to a conclusion that such a linkage would render the
international trade regime inadequate in effectuating members'
preferences . 193 Because regime theory predicates i nstitutional
FOR INTERNATIONAL CO-OPER..!\TION 1 2 (A.J .R. Groom & Paul Taylor eds . ,
1990) .
1 90 See Geoffrey R. Watson, The Death of Treaty, 5 5 OHIO ST. L .J. 7 8 1 , 807
(1 994) (stating that regime theory can be compared to economics because it
treats states as unitary, rational, ma..ximizing actors) .
1 9 1 Patricia Stirling, for example, advocates the creation of a human rights
body within the World Trade Organization that will oversee the administra
tion of multilateral enforcement of human rights though trade sanctions. See
Patricia Stirling, The Use of Trade Sanctions as an Enforcement Mechan ism for Ba·
sic Human Rights: A Proposal for Addition to the World Trade Organization, 1 1
AM. U. J. lNT'L L. & POL'Y 1 , 4 (1996) .
1 92 See Smith, supra note 1 84, at 8 1 9 n.95 (noting that in the reai world,
human rights regimes and commercial regimes are wholly independent of one
another, and using the separation of the World Trade Orgamzation and the
United Nations as an example) .
1 93 The criteria for determining which issues are proper for consideration
by the -world Trade Organization that are discussed supra notes 1 87- 1 89 and
accompanying text almost certainly would exclude this p roposal . This prop osal
would not be considered within the scope of the Wond Trade Orgamzat10n's
authorit y because it would fail tests number two (that is, resolution of this issue
would not significantly increase trade) and number three (that is, it would be
very difficult for the World Trade Organization to supervise enforcement of
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change on 1h ow e,r
11.r;ectzve t h e c h ange m the 1nstrtut1on wou l. d
- b e , 19.d.
upon receiving a negative answer it would resist the change .
Sociological institutionalism asks a different question. Rather
than concerning itself with the utilitarian effectiveness of the in
stitution, sociological institutionalism asks whether the contem
plated change would render the institution more legitimate, that
is, whether it would be considered more appropriate for the
\Xf orld Trade O rganization to establ ish linkage with human rights
than it would be for the Organization not to do so. "X'hile this
A rticle does not delve into the myriad debates over human rights,
there is a body of international l aw scholarship that concludes
that human rights p rincipals have achieved almost universal ac
ceptance . 1 95 Interestingly, some of that scholarship suggests that
the increased acceptance of human rights principles has proceeded
hand in hand with increased acceptance of the globalization of
commerce. 19 6 If indeed it can be demonstrated that a demand for
core human rights forms part of the cultural context in which the
World Trade O rganization is embedded, and if it can be shown
that a connection between those core rights and international
commercial regulation is considered app ropriate, then sociological
i nstitutionalism, unlike re qime theory, might provide a theoreti
cal justification for linkage. 97
The alternative instituti onalisms might also p rovide i nstnlC
tion in how to effectuate linkage . Regime theory and institu.

·

any rules that it p romulgated on the subject) . These criteria, it should be re
called, reflect a regime theory o rientation toward institutions.
.
194 see supra note 1 8 an d accompanymg text.
.

195

See, e.g. , Jost Del�riick, A More Effective International Law or a New
'TVor!d Law "?-Some Aspects of the Developmen t o r International Law in a
Changing International System, 68 IND. L.J . 705, 713 (1993) ("Human dignity, as

the anchor point for the normative vali dity of in ternational human rights law
and as a basK guiding principle for their interpretation and application, has be
come more firmly established within the international community than ever
befo re. ") ; Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal A trocities,
AM J. INT'L L.
(noting the f eneral acceptance of human
rights as a subject for international regulation) ; A1ex Y. Seita, Globalization and
the Converf£ence of Values,
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 429,
(not ing that
"the rhetonc of human rights has gained universal acceptance") .

89

554, 554 (1995)
30
447 (1997)
196
See De! briick, supra note 195, at 7 1 3 (stating that "individual rights and
fundamentJl freedoms are accepted, in principle, along with economic . . .
rights"); Seita, supra note 195, at 447 (arguing that the acceptance of human
rights goes hand

m

hand with economic globalizat ion) .

1 97 This hypothetical i s p rovided only as an example, and should not be
construed as a fully developed argument for, or against, such a linkage .
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tional economics rely on the self-interest of actors to effectuate a
change in institutions; clearly, however, this theoretical device is
not perfectly applicable in the real world. 1 9 8 An actor cannot
simply demonstrate that a particular linkage is more effective or
efficient in satisfying World Trade Organization members' pref
erences and expect the members to fall in line. On an intuitive
level, it is understood that historical and cultural b arriers must be
overcome; such barriers are the lifeblood of historical and socio
logical institutionalism.
An example of linkage that might be instructed by historical
institutionalism and sociological institutionalism is a linkage be
tween trade and the environment. 1 99 Parsing the mass of litera
ture on trade and the environment would overwhelm this Arti
cle;200 therefore, a single, discrete example is used.
Steve
Charnovitz, who has written prodigiously and insightfully about

198 An obvious cnttctsm is that the ineffective or inefficient institutions

that are created, often persist, or are resistant to change, while more suitable
alternatives do not come into effect.
199 Reconciliation of trade policy with environmental p olicy is probably of
some relevance to the survival of the international trade regime. See Robert
Howse & Michael J. Trebilcock, The Fair Trade-Free Trade Debate: Trade, La

bour and the Environment, in ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 38, at 2 (suggesting that popular support for the international

trade regime will evaporate tf the trade regime does not address concerns) ;
Nichols, supra note 32, at 702 ("Placing primacy on trade t hus imperils popular
and soveretgn support for a trade regime, and endangers all of free trade.") . The
infamous Tuna/Dolphin decisions, which were not even adopted by the
GATT, is indicative of the tensions. The mere release of t hese deCisions, which
exalted trade concerns over environmental concerns, led to calls for the United
States to withdraw from the trade regime. See Belina Anderson, Unilateral

Trade Measures and Environmental Protection Policy, 66 TEMP. L . REV. 75 1 , 75152 ( 1993) (describing reactions t o the Tuna/Dolphin decisions) . For descrip

tions of the Tuna/Dolphin proceedings and decisions, see Joel P. Trachtman,
GA IT Dispute Settlement Panel, 86 AM J . INT'L L. 1 42 ( 1 992) . For a respected
discussion of the many issues concerning trade and the environment (the men
tion of which is not intended to slight the many other excellent discussions) , see
the essays contained in T H E GREENING OF WORLD TRADE ISSUES (Kym An
derson & Richard Blackhurst eds . , 1992) .
200
Cf Nichols, supra note 32, at 673 ("To bundle all of the many values re
garding environment tnto one cohesive scheme would be a monumental, and
probably impossible, task.") ; Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89
NW . U. L. REV. 1 227, 1230 ( 1995) ("Tust listing some of the many pressing envi
ronmental issues can lead to despondency: species extinction, deforestation, de
sertification, toxic waste, acid rain, global climate change, and severe air and
water pollution in large cities and poor countries. ") .
.
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the relationship between law and trade/01 has advocated a funda
mental change in the rules of the World Trade Organizati on-a
change that would lead to greater participation by nongovern.
.
. g proc202 m
. t h e 0 rgamzatwn
.
, s ru 1 emak m
menta1 orgamzatwns
2 3
ess. 0
Charnovitz and others forcefully argue that n ongovern
mental organizations have demonstrably aided other international
organizations in the creation of effective trade policy and link.
,.
·
.
arguages . 204 . 1n ot h er word s , Ch arnovttz o ffers a ut1· 1 1tanan
ment . 205 Despite this argument, the institutional alteration that
Charnovitz calls for has not been effected. 20 6
Regime t heory and institutional economics have l ittle t o say
about the failure of a proposed alteration other than that if the de.

·

20 1

See, e.g. , Steve Charnovitz, Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade: Defog
ging the Debate, 27 CORNELL INT'L LT. 459 (1994) ; Steve Charnovitz, Green
Roots, Bad Prun ing: GA TT Rules and Their Application to Environmental Trade
Measures, 7 TUL. ENVTL. L .J . 299 (1994) ; Steve Charnovitz, The NAFTA Envi
ronmental Side Agreement: Implications for Environmental Cooperation, Trade
PoliCJ andA mer!can Treatymaking 8 T EMP. INT'L & C O MP: L.r 25� � 1 994) .
- i. Charnov1tz uses the term � nongovernmental orgamzatwns m a man
ner that does not include businesses. See Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of
Participation: NGOs and International Governance, 1 8 MICH. J . INT ' L L. 1 8 3 ,
1 87 �\997) .
.
-1 See Steve Charnov1tz,
Partzczpatzon ofNongovernmental Organzzatzons m
the World Trade Organization, 1 7 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 33 1 , 3 3 1 (1996) .
204
See id. at 3 4 1 (citing NGO participation in GATT Uruguay Round) ; A.
Dan Tarlock, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the Development
of International Environmental Law, 68 C HI . KENT L. REV. 61 (1 992) . But see
Philip M. Nichols, Realism, L iberalism, Values, and the World Trade Organiza
tion, 17 U. PA. J . INT'L ECON. L. 8 5 1 , 856-60 (1996) (cautioning against relying
on the results of nongovernmental participation in other international orgam
zations unless it is demonstrated that that organization is comparable to the
World Trade Organization) .
205
See Charnovitz, supra note 203, at 341 (arguing that nongovernmental
organization participation would facilitate negotiations) . Of course, to those
who are ideologically predis oosed to discount environmental concerns, ignor
ing any attempts to reconcite the two issues might seem to have the greatest
utility; given the plasticity of economic assumptions it is even possible that they
could construct mathematical proofs for their position. See Cotter, supra note
40, at 2 1 14, 2 1 1 7- 1 8 (discussing the falsifiability problem with econom1cs) . The
point, however, is not that the World Trade Organization must embrace envi
ronmental issues, but instead, that failure to consider environmental concerns
endangers the continued viability of the trade regime. Cf Howse & Trebil
cock, supra note 1 99, at 3 ("If international trade law simply rules out of court
any tra d e response to the policies of other countries, however abhorrent, then
there will be an understandable, and dangerous, temptation to declare that the
international trade law is an ass [sic].") .
206
See Steve Charnovitz, A Critical Guide to The �ti"TO 's Report on TYade
and Environment, 14 ARIZ. J . INT'L & COMP. L . 3 4 1 , 3 4 1 42 (1997) .
.

.

.

.
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sired institurional alteration did not occur, it must not have been
perceived as effective o r efficient by international actors .207 His
torical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism, on the
other hand, speak to historical constraints that must be overcome,
cognitions that must be expanded or changed, and cultural l egiti
mations that must be elicited and made explicit. While this A rti
cle does not purport to engage in the laborious task of applying
the alternative institutionalisms to a specific linkage, the useful
ness of these theoretical schools to those who advocate practical
linkages should be clear.
Charnovitz does point out that the proposed International
Trade Organization, which would have j oined the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund as the third Bretton Woods
institution if its charter had been ratified by the United States in
1948 /0 8 had p rovisions fo r the participation of nongovernmental
organizations. He suggests that this means the w·orld Trade O r
ganization should do the same.2 09 As a purely legal m atter, of
course, the actions of one i nternational organization have little
bearing on the requirements to be made of another. 2 1 0 Historical
institutionalism, on the other hand, does provide a theoretical jus
tification for exploration of the history of nongovernmental o r
ganization participation. This theoretical construct, however, re
quires more rigor than simple iteration of the history of the
International Trade Organization. Rather, it suggests examina
tion of at least two critical junctures: the point at which the In
ternational Trade Organization was not created, and the point at
which the drafters of the W orld Trade Organization's charter dis
carded any plans to deeply involve nongovernmental organiza..
tions . Scrutinizing these critical junctures for the purpose of de207

See North, supra note 8 (noting that entrepreneurs change or do not
chan�e institutions based on their perceptions of the benefits) .
2 8
See ROBERT E. HUDEC, T H E GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD
TRADE DIPLOMACY 1 1 - 1 2 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing the history of the Interna
tional Trade Org;mization); Nichols, supra note 132, at 3 89-9 1 (same) .
209
See Charnovitz, supra note 203 , at 338-39. Charnovitz has also written
the definitive article on the history of nongovernmental organization participa
tion in international organizations. See St eve Charnovitz, Two c;enturies of Par·
tzczpatzon: NGOs and lntematzonal Governance, 1 8 l'vliCH. J . INT L L. 1 83 (1 997) .
2 10
In ge n e ral the authority and requirements of an international organiza
tion are bounded by its organic documents, or by a limited number of powers
that are implied to internatlonal organizations. See Edward Gordon, The World
Court and the Interpretation of Constitutive Treaties, 59 AM . J . INT'L L. 794, 8 1 621 (1965) ; Nichols, supra note 1 85, at 723-24.
,
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termining how the choices .rnade at those cleavage points possibly
constrain future institutional choices could provide guidance for
those who wish to effect institutional alteration.
5.

CONCLUSION

Institutionalism is an increasingly useful tool in the repertoire
of international law scholarship. Among other uses, institutional
ism has been used to scrutinize the 'World Trade Organization.
Institutionalism, as it is used in international law scholarship,
however, reflects only t w o sources: regime theory from interna
tional relations theory, and i nstitutional economics from the so
cial science of economics. Regime theory and institutional eco
nomics, however, do not exhaust the universe of possible sources
for models of institutional analysis. This A rticle offers two ex
amples of other models for institutional analysis : historical insti
tutionalism from political science, and sociological institutional
ism from sociology. Neither school of institutionalism has been
used to analyze the World Trade Organization.
Historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism
differ from regime theory and institutional economics in funda
mental ways. To the international trade law scholar who is seek
ing models for analysis, these differences should not be looked
upon as reasons to discredit one school or another, but instead as
opportunities to examine international law from a variety of per
spectives, or even to hybridize in legal analysis the strengths of
several other disciplines while pruning their weaker analytical
principles. As this Article briefly demonstrates, historical institu
tionalism and sociological institutionalism can lead to new in
sights concerning the Worl d Trade Organization.
\)'/bile trade scholars should appreciate the possibility of new
tools of analysis, the existence of these tools raises an interesting
question concerning why some fo rms of institutionalism have
been used in trade scholarshio and others have not. In order to
answer that question, scholars must recognize that trade scholarship itself is an institution, and is subj ect to the same scnltiny as
the World Trade Organization. By examining how analytical
linkages occur or do not occur in trade scholarship, lessons can be
learned that have applicability to the broader questions of theo
retical and practical linka ge to the '1Y/ orld Trade Organization.
j_
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